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Problem

Personality, a construct representing the
dynamic integration of the individual, remains compli
cated, both in theory and in research.

The purpose of

this study was to explore a conceptual paradigm of per
sonality through the relationship between cognitive
flexibility and moral reasoning.
Researchers had not looked at the relationship
between cognitive flexiblity, as measured by the Stroop
Color and Word Test, and moral reasoning, as measured by
the Defining Issues Test (DIT).
This study focused on the relationship between
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning.

It looked for

more than an understanding of the relationship, however.
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thus affording beginning research in the development of
the proposed paradigm.
Method
The DIT and the Stroop Test were administered to
freshman and sophomore college students.

Chi-square and

descriptive analyses of the data from 133 subjects were
calculated.
Results
Four directional research hypotheses predicted a
necessary-but-not-sufficient relationship between cogni
tive flexibility and moral reasoning.

Two hypotheses

used the P score on the DIT while the other two involved
the D measure.
four hypotheses;
on the D scores

The findings supported two out of the
one on the P scores (
( =

3.50)

from the

While the other two research

= 3.27) and one

DIT.
hypotheses were not

supported by the analyses, trends suggested by the data
were studied by a number of t tests.

These tests

revealed significantly higher DIT means in the flexible
group than the not flexible group in the third quartile

D

grouping (t = 1.092 with 43 degrees of freedom and
E < .05) and in the upper quartile P grouping (t = 2.502
with 23 degrees of freedom and g < .01).
It is believed that this study contributes direct
and indirect support of a necessary-but-not-sufficient
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relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral
reasoning.

It may be said that cognitive flexibility is

a prerequisite for higher moral development.

It is not,

however, the onlv component needed for such development.
The relationship between cognitive flexibility
and moral reasoning can be taken as evidence for an
interaction between the subsystems and cognitive mosaics
within the context of the proposed paradigm.
In summary, this study provides beginning work on
a personality paradigm and contributes both implications
and applications of the findings.
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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION
Personality, a construct representing the dynamic
integration of the individual, remains complicated, both
in theory and in research.

This study, while proposing a

paradigm of one aspect of personality, primarily focuses
on the empirical exploration within that paradigm of the
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral
reasoning.

The paradigm also provides a theoretical

perspective on how, in one respect, an individual inter
acts with his environment.
This chapter includes background on the theoreti
cal development, definitions of terms used in the disser
tation, an explanation of the proposed paradigm, and
statements delineating the focus of the investigation.
Background
Past trends in brain research have primarily
focused on anatomical and hemispheric orientations.
Brain research currently, however, looks also to an
overall pattern of cognition.

There has been a move.
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therefore,

from "part" or even "hemispheric" models to a

focus on overall brain patterns.
The submitted paradigm evolved from a model
developed by Wardell and Royce (1978), from this resear
cher's unpublished master's thesis involving hemispheric
processing, and from a careful observation of indi
viduals' reasoning abilities and limitations evident
within varying situations.
Models provide ways of organizing and synthesiz
ing information and, in addition, provide frameworks of
understanding for other paradigms. Fulfilling both of
these functions, Wardell and Royce's (1978) personality
model (see Chapter 2) contributes both a beginning
framework of understanding and a point of departure for
the proposed paradigm.

The Wardell and Royce model was

discovered in an attempt to connect cognition and affect
within the personality.

Due to its similarity in

conceptualizations of the mind and personality with the
proposed paradigm,

further investigation and inclusion in

the dissertation of the Wardell and Royce model resulted.
While not serving such functions, Ornstein's
multimind theory (1986) does provide support for the
proposed paradigm (see Chapter 2).

Ornstein's views on

multiple minds and on movement between them in interact
ing within the environment is somewhat similar to the
proposed paradigm.

Both the Wardell and Royce and
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Ornstein models offer representations of the mind and
cognitive processes which have similar aspects to those
of the proposed paradigm.

Both models,

theoretical support for this research.

in turn, lend
The two models

and their relationship to the proposed paradigm will be
explored in Chapter 2.
Personal research, itself, also prompted this
study.

The unpublished master's thesis shows significant

differences in the types of processing used in the two
hemispheres.

Analyses and the implications of this

information resulted in many new ideas.

One idea, a

realization of the many capabilities of the hemispheres,
led to the conceptualization of "mosaics"

(see page 5)

and the dynamics of cognitive flexibility as defined in
this study.
As mentioned, theory, research, and observations
contributed to the development of this research.

The

observations of reasoning regression in several students
in a graduate counseling program provided this third
factor in the development of this research.

A sig

nificant proportion of entering students who appeared to
be creative, bright, and independent were observed to
regress during their first two quarters in the program.
The behavioral manifestations of this regression
included increasing questions regarding what the teacher
thought important, increasing concern for what would be
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on a test rather than more independent assimilation of
covered topics, fewer verbalized applications of the
material, fewer verbalized theorizations which differed
from a framework under discussion, and other behaviors
inappropriate for that level of graduate study.

In

general, these students appeared more dependent on the
faculty, less creative, and less risk-taking; they had
moved to a more sterile,

"fill-in-the-blank" mentality.

This regression came during the highly stressful
periods of entering and completing a graduate program.
As the stress continued, however, differing adaptations
to this tension were noted.

Some moved past the regres

sion; others, unfortunately, failed to do so— or appeared
unable to return to the levels of flexibility they had
when they entered graduate school.
This observation, contributions from other
theorists, and this researcher's own work during her
master's program led to the definitions, proposed para
digm, and chosen hypotheses which follow.
Definitions
So that the proposed paradigm and discussion of
related studies and theories may be more fully under
stood, the following terms are defined;
•

Brain patterns— a construct representing a

unique combination of cognitive components used within a
situation.

It is recognized that cognition does not work
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alone in personality.
better term.

Cognitive-affective represents a

Lack of adequate prior research with this

term, however, limits the exploration of this study to
just the cognitive aspect of personality.
•

Cognition— all various modes of knowing (per

ceiving, remembering, imagining, judging, etc.) in
contrast to affective and conative dimensions of per
sonality.
•

Cognitive flexibility— involves the ability to

utilize different cognitive mosaics or to create new ones
as needed.
•

Cognitive mosaic— a construct within the

proposed paradigm referring to any particular brain
pattern which is a combination of cognitive components.
•

Cognitive style— broadly, the rather consis

tent manner in which a person thinks or knows; more
specifically, a particular group of cognitive patterns.
This study defines cognitive style as a unique combina
tion of an individual's particular cognitive mosaics and
cognitive flexibility.

While new mosaics and/or changes

in usage occur through growth or regression, it is
believed that the gestalt remains fairly stable.
• Hierarchies— refers to cognitive mosaic hier
archies.

The proposed paradigm consists of a cognitive

mosaics repertoire with two hierarchical dimensions;
a dimension of individual adaptability (those mosaics
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(1)
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containing a similar degree of adaptability)

and (2) a

dimension of mosaic recency (those mosaics developed last
are highest in hierarchy).
• Hierarchical regression— conscious/unconscious
selection of an inappropriate mosaic.

This usage proves

less helpful or efficient in processing information
regarding a particular situation.
•

Model— a system of organization which provides

a framework for understanding relationships and proces
ses.

For the purpose of this paper it refers to the sys

tem used by Wardell and Royce (1978).
#

Moral reasoning— a construct referring to

those special kinds of cognitive processing concerned
with the "right" and "wrong" of behaviors.

It is also

defined here as the interaction between an individual's
cognition and values.
# Necessary but not sufficient— this term is used
frequently to describe a type of relationship within the
proposed paradigm.

In this usage the concept means that

some ability (cognitive flexibility)

is a necessary part

of another ability (higher moral reasoning), but that the
first ability (cognitive flexiblity)

is not the onlv

ability, characteristic, or factor necessary for the
resulting ability (higher moral reasoning).

This term,

with the same meaning, appears in research and theory to
describe relationships.
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•

Paradigm— another term referring to a system

of organization which provides a framework for under
standing relationships and processes.
of this study, however,

For the purposes

it refers to the system proposed

by this researcher.
#

Personality— the integrated, dynamic organiza

tion of physical, mental, moral, and social dimensions
(impulses, habits,

interests, complexes, opinions, senti

ments, beliefs, etc.).
Description of Proposed Paradigm
In this paradigm it is proposed that a basic
function for organizing information about relationships
and processes exists at birth and that the individual's
interaction with the environment prompts further organi
zational mosaics or patterns of processing.
A pattern consists of a unique combination of
cognitive processes within the mind.

As an acknowledge

ment that any pattern or mosaic does not occur within a
vacuum, the pattern is described as a brain pattern.
Cognition does not act alone within the personality.
Cognition-affeet represents a better term.

Due to lack

of adequate prior research under this term and the limits
of this investigation, the study is focused on just the
cognitive aspect of the personality.
therefore made between mind and brain.

No distinction is
Whether such

patterns are identifiable by physiological testing, or
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whether subdivisions of mosaics are possible,

remains

unspeculated.
The first pattern may be genetically tied and
thus develops earlier than other patterns.

It may even

be that hand dominance, which occurs during the first few
years of life, is a product of such a configuration.

It

is also this basic pattern which may allow the first
interaction with the environment.
Once this first mosaic of processing is firmly
established, the individual is able to interpret and
utilize data from the environment.

This pattern,

therefore, exists as just one of many eventual patterns.
Varied experiences (any experience from going to a
circus, the first day in school or a church, positive
interactions with peers, to child abuse), maturation, and
learning prompt development of new ways of perceiving
data.
The proposed paradigm includes a repertoire of
mosaics involving the cognitive subsystem.

It is

believed that this repertoire has two dimensions:

(1) a

hierarchy of individual adaptability (those mosaics which
contain a similar degree of adaptability— (see Figure 1)
and (2) a hierarchy of mosaic recency (those mosaics
developed last are highest in the hierarchy).
Figure 1 includes a dimensional continuum of
adaptability.

The factors listed in the middle (ranging
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Recently acquired
mosaics at a less
adequate (mature)
level of adaptation.

V
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Recently acquired
mosaics at a more
adequate (mature)
level of adaptation,

Affect
Assumptions
Attitudes
Beliefs
How Acquire Knowledge
Knowledge
Memories
Motivation
Prior Experience
Values
Less recently
acquired mosaics
at a less adequate
(mature) level of
adaptation.

Increasinc
Adaptation

Less recently
acquired mosaics
at a more adequate
(mature) level of
adaptation.

Figure 1 . A two-dimensional representation of the
recency and adaptation continuums.
The factors listed at
the intersection of these two dimensions represent forces
that may either prompt or hinder movement to the more
adaptive mosaics.
This, in turn, affects the nurturance
or stifling of cognitive flexibility.
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from affect to values) are varied experiences and
learnings which prompt usage and/or creation of new
mosaics.
This research defines more adaptive as an optimal
interaction with the environment to produce beneficial
results over time.

While the components may nurture the

move to more adaptive mosaics, some may act as a hin
drance to movement in this direction.
engaged, they become stronger.

As mosaics are

Some individuals use the

less adaptive mosaics— some by choice, others uncon
sciously.
It is believed that training can lower the power
or pull of less adaptive mosaics and those past experien
ces that reinforce an already existing barrier in the
process of growth.
A potential starting point to choose to use more
adaptive mosaics exists when the individual becomes aware
of his own thinking and strives to use those characteris
tics associated with higher flexibility.

Following this,

usage of more adaptive mosaics would prompt an opposite
force moving the person to the more adaptive end of the
continuum.
The two dimensions and the placement of the
mosaics is represented by Figure 2.

The dots represent

mosaics; the size of the dot represents the strength or
pulling power of a particular mosaic.

The dots also
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Figure 2 . A visual interaction between the two dimen
sions of adaptation and recency and the cognitive mosa
ics.
It is believed that the left side of the continuum
represents a usage of mosaics which is less available to
conscious awareness.
In contrast, it is believed that
increasing adaptation includes more usage of mosaics with
conscious awareness.
At this end of the continuum,
therefore, usage of mosaics includes both conscious and
unconscious processes.
The dots represent mosaics; the
size of the dots reflect the strength of a particular
mosaic. Mosaics A or D, for instance has more strength
than mosaic B or C.
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represent mosaics both within a certain level of recency
and level of adaptability.
Figure 3 incorporates the above dimensions and
mosaics with levels of adaptation in this conceptualiza
tion.

The left side of the figure shows the less

adaptive mosaics with highly permeable developmental
levels.

This represents the belief that of the less

adaptive mosaics there is less differentiation between
mosaics developed at differing stages of life.
words,

In other

an individual is more likely to use a more

immature mosaic within the less adaptive range than when
more adaptive mosaics are employed.
As with Figure 2, the size of the dots represent
the strength of the mosaic and the factors listed
previously in Figure 1 act as prompters or inhibitors to
growth towards the right side of the figure.
As mentioned above, mosaics can exert differing
attractions or pulling powers.

In this proposed paradigm

mosaics derive strength from usage.

As an individual

uses a mosaic, this increases the strength of the
pattern.

Therefore, when less adaptive mosaics are

frequently used, this causes a pulling power away from
growth of the individual.

On the other hand, with

awareness and choice, an individual can consciously
strengthen the more adaptive mosaics.

This has the

effect of expanding and strengthening the entire
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O—

Increasing
O

O

Adaptation

Figure 3 . A combination of Figures 1 and 2 in addition
to a visual representation of the levels of adaptation.
It is noted that the left side of the figure, the less
adaptive end of the continuum, shows less differentia
tion/more permeable levels.
The more adaptive side, on
the other hand, shows greater differentiation of the
levels of recency.
This also reflects a more conscious
usage of mosaics— a definition of cognitive flexibility.
For example, there is a more equal chance of using mosaic
B or C than A or D.
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repertoire— another definition of growth and increased
flexibility.
Cognitive flexibility is the ability to utilize
an appropriate pattern or to create other patterns as
needed.

It forms the core of the paradigm and describes

the individual interacting with the environment.

The

types and usage of patterns exist within the cognitive
aspect of the personality, yet influence other aspects of
personality and behavior.
Statement of the Problem
The relationship between cognitive flexibility
and cognitive styles, behaviors, and personality is not
fully understood.

It would appear, therefore, that the

relating of cognitive flexibility with moral reasoning
was warranted as an area of study.
Moral reasoning is an established area of current
theory and research.

A substantial proportion of this

research uses the Defining Issues Test

(DIT) in exploring

the relationship between moral reasoning and cognitionaffect, personality styles, and other constructs.
Researchers had not, however,

looked at its relationship

with cognitive flexibility, as measured by the Stroop
Color and Word Test.

More specifically, there was no

research which compared the Defining Issues Test and the
Stroop Color and Word Test within any population.
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W a r d e n and Royce (1978) , providing a founda
tional model, stated the continued need for empirical
studies in the area of personality.

As theorists, they

stated that empirical research may be some time in
coming, but that such research remains necessary to the
area of personality (Wardell & Roycs, 1978).
It was not proposed that this study provides
empirical support for the Wardell and Royce model.

It

was instead a beginning of empirical exploration of the
proposed paradigm.
Delineation of Research Problem
Cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning are
seen to exist as aspects within a holistic and dynamic
concept of personality.

Since there are differing

abstractions of personality, this section will delineate
briefly the structure of these elements as defined by
this researcher.
The theoretical orientation for this study is a
dynamic framework, as envisioned by this researcher and
others (see Chapter 2).

This study focused essentially

on the cognition aspect of the personality and on flexi
bility within cognitive mosaics or patterns.

Cognitive

flexibility involves certain capacities within this area
of the personality structure.
The cognitive area of the personality,

in turn,

underlies an individual's styles and values (Wardell &
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Royce, 1978).

This researcher believes that moral rea

soning develops and exists within a fusion of a person's
cognitive flexibility and values.
aspects, the personality is formed.

From these integrated
Cognitive flexi

bility and moral reasoning, as measured by the Stroop
Test and Defining Issues Test (DIT) instruments, con
stituted the personality dynamic under investigation.
Purpose of the Studv
This study focused on the relationship between
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning.

It looked for

more than an understanding of the relationship, however,
thus affording heuristic value.
Statement of Research Hypotheses
The Stroop Test and DIT testing manuals provide
standardized administration instructions and practical
norms for usage in research.

The Stroop Color and Word

Test consists of three tasks using the names of colors
and colored print to create a novel assignment which
involves something that the subject has never done prior
to taking this test (see Chapter 3 for further descrip
tion) .

Performance on these different tasks and com-

parisions between these performances produce a cognitive
flexibility score.
The median of the sample's scores was used for
dividing the population in terms of flexibility— those
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above this measure are classified as flexible; those
below this measure are classified as constricted or not
flexible.
The Defining Issues Test consists of six
vignettes involving moral reasoning dilemmas and state
ments reflecting levels of moral reasoning stages devel
oped by Lawrence Kohlberg (see Chapter 2).

An

individual's response to these statements provide what
are called P and D scores.

The P score represents a

weighted formula using responses from the top two levels
of reasoning; the D score uses a weighted formula
reflecting responses from all levels.

Thus both scores

reflect levels of moral reasoning.
The P score reflects the "'relative importance a
subject gives to principled moral considerations in
making a decision about moral dilemmas'"

(Rest, 1979).

In contrast, the D score reflects an "overall index of
moral judgment development . . . the score is higher to
the extent that the

subject gives high

stage items, and the score

ratings to high

is lower to the extent that

the subject gives high ratings to low stage items" (Rest,
1986).
The P and D
ings.

scores are divided into four group

Both P and D scores represent a general index of

moral reasoning maturity.

The following hypotheses

reflect these suggested divisions and classifications.
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1.

Among those subjects with a P score of 35-46

on the DIT, there will be a significantly higher
frequency of Stroop flexibility scores above the
median of the sample than below the median.
2.

Among those subjects with e. D score of 21-27

on the DIT, there will be a significantly
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores
above the median of the sample than below the
median.
3.

Among those subjects with a P score of 47 or

higher on the DIT, there will be a significantly
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores
above the median of the sample than below the
median.
4.

Among those subjects with a D score of 28 or

higher on the DIT, there will be a significantly
higher frequency of Stroop flexibility scores
above the median of the sample than below the
median.
Importance of the Studv
The exploration of the proposed paradigm provides
insights into this theory and the application of this
theory.

It also offers opportunities for further under

standing of human processing and ideas for additional
research in this and related areas of personality theory.
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Delimitations
The study was delimited in terms of focus and
population.

It proposed to support a paradigm with the

chosen hypotheses. The hypotheses were merely one focus,
one empirical examination drawn from a conceptual para
digm.

These hypotheses, however, provided valuable

information on the relationship between moral reasoning
and cognitive flexibility and information regarding the
tentative paradigm. The population was delimited to
beginning freshmen and sophomores in church-related
colleges.
Limitations
Limitations included the inability to generalize
to all populations.

This was countered, however,

in an

interest in the tests themselves rather than in the
population per se.
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CHAPTER II
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduct ion
This study focused on the relationship between
cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning.

Cognitive

flexibility was operationally defined in terms of the
Stroop Color and Word Test, and moral reasoning by the
Defining Issues Test (DIT).
The highly conceptual and relatively extensive
nature of the concepts emphasizes a need for a carefully
chosen delimitation of the literature under discussion.
This chapter first addresses the justification of the
proposed paradigm and research question.

Because of the

prior description of this tentative paradigm and its
relationship with the hypotheses, this chapter includes
contrasts with some of the presented theories.

With this

background in mind, this chapter then explores the lit
erature review of cognitive flexibility and moral reason
ing and research involving the Stroop Test and the DIT.
Theoretical Foundation for Hypotheses
While the paradigm relating to this research is
original with this study, other theories offered creative
20
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ideas which further will be seen to justify the hypo
theses' development.

Wardell and Royce (1978), for

example, provide a background model and central support
to the paradigm.

These theorists and Ornstein (1986)

provide theories of mind and personality which both
contrast and support this proposed paradigm and tested
hypotheses.
Wardell and Rovce
The Wardell and Royce model

(1978) supplies a

theoretical backdrop and points of reference for a system
of unresearched ideas— the proposed paradigm.
The lowest systems of their model (sensory and
motor— see Figure 4) consists of an individual's interac
tion with the environment.

The cognitive and affective

subsystems are at the next level underlying the person's
style and value subsystems.

Providing a comprehensive

structure, a gestalt— the personality subsumes these
various subsystems.
The subsystems interact with each other within
the personality.

For instance, an individual's lifestyle

evolves from an interaction between affective and value
subsystems ; an individual's world view derives from the
interaction of the cognitive and style subsystems; an
interaction between the style and value subsystems cre
ates a person's self-image.

Therefore, there is inter

dependence between subsystems within the mind.
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Figure 4 . A visual representation of the proposed para
digm with the Wardell and Royce model.
The insert de
picts the cognitive subsystem; the layers of rectangles
represent a potentially infinite number of cognitive
mosaics.
The abilities or aspects of any mosaic are not
unique to that mosaic, but each mosaic does consist of a
unique combination of abilities.
(Adapted figure taken
from Wardell & Royce, Journal of Personality. 1978, 474505) .
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As mentioned earlier, the Wardell and Royce model
provides a framework.

The proposed paradigm focuses on

the cognitive subsystem and its interactions with other
subsystems (see Figure 4).

Here cognitive mosaics would

exist within the cognitive subsystem.

This study's

definition of moral reasoning equates it with the inter
action between the values and cognitive subsystems.
With this relationship in mind, it is believed
that further exploration of the conceptual similari
ties/dissimilarities between the model and the proposed
paradigm will allow for a more complete understanding of
this research.
Wardell and Royce's definition of cognitive style
is one point of connectedness between these two models.
The 1978 article focuses on the style subsystem and its
interactions with cognition and affect.

They describe

cognitive styles, affective styles, and cognitive-affec
tive styles.

They define style as ". . . a characteris

tic mode or way of manifesting cognitive and/or affective
phenomena"

(Royce, 1973).

These styles, as mentioned,

affect and are affected by other subsystems within their
personality model.
Wardell and Royce describe cognitive style in
terms of a manifestation of cognition.
styles include the (1) rational,

Their cognitive

(2) empirical, and (3)

metaphoric.
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This research, in contrast, defines cognitive
style as the unique combination of an individual's cogni
tive mosaics and his flexibility.
In review, cognitive mosaics consist of a com
bination of cognitive components.

Cognitive flexibility

involves the ability to select or even create these
mosaics which are appropriate to situational needs.

A

comparison of the Wardell and Royce model with this
study's cognitive styles and eight substyles, therefore,
involves relating the substyles to cognitive flexibility
and cognitive mosaics.
For instance, certain cognitive substyles are
associated with cognitive flexiblity.

This means that

the description of a particular cognitive substyle also
describes cognitive flexiblity.
Other cognitive substyles relate to the cognitive
mosaics.

These substyles describe characteristics of any

particular mosaic, or pattern.

These substyles are seen,

therefore, to reflect a combination of cognitive com
ponents.

The direction (Wardell and Royce describe

certain substyles in terms of polar opposites— e.g.,
abstract versus concrete) and/or intensity of these
substyles seen in any pattern differs with the mosaic in
question.
It is not proposed that these substyles exist
within the cognitive system.

It is proposed, however.
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that this study's cognitive style combination of cogni
tive mosaics and cognitive flexibility underlies Wardell
and Royce's eight cognitive substyles and the three
cognitive styles.
Wardell and Royce's eight substyles or charac
teristics tie in with this study's conceptualization of
cognitive style, cognitive mosaics, and cognitive flexi
bility as follows;
Cognitive complexity—
(Wardell and Royce definition):
individual with complexity " . . .

An

makes greater

use of his cognitive structure . . .

he is . .

. flexible, and more independent of the judg
ment of others."
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This characteristic comes closest to the defi
nition of cognitive flexibility.

It parallels

flexibility in the cognitive subsystem and
reflects, therefore, the part of cognitive
style associated with cognitive flexibility.
Differentiation—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

represents an inclination to ". . . pursue and
use more detailed conceptualizations . . . "
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(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects the part of cognitive style
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo
nents .
Category width—
(Wardell and Royce definition):
involves " . . .

This

broad versus narrow categoriz

ing . . . ”
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects the part of cognitive style
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo
nents .
Conceptual integration—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

reflects an ". . . inclination to explore and
develop relationships among concepts."

This

concept may be considered a part of cognitive
complexity.
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects the part of cognitive style
associated with cognitive flexibility.
Analytical versus relational—
(Wardell and Royce definition);

This

involves a preference for a type of concept—
inferential versus relational.
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(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects the part of cognitive style
associated with the cognitive mosaic com
ponents .
Compartmentalization—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

reflects a ” '. . . tendency to compartmental
ize ideas . . .

in discrete categories . . .'"

(Messick & Kogan, 1963).
(Association with proposed paradigm);
This reflects that part of style associated
with cognitive mosaic components.
Abstract versus concrete—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

involves the use of ". . . more information and
more strategies to solve problems."
(Association with proposed paradigm):
It is believed that those with relatively more
abstract style show greater cognitive flexi
bility in the cognitive subsystem.

The basis

for this belief lies in the established
association between higher reasoning and the
ability to work with abstract concepts.

The

abstract style reflects that aspect of cogni
tive style associated with flexibility.
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Leveling versus sharpening—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

Leveling

involves lessening "fine shades of distinc
tion"; sharpening involves increasing distinc
tions between items.
(Association with proposed paradigm);
This reflects the aspect of style associated
with the cognitive mosaics combination.
Unlike the proposed paradigm, Wardell and Royce
place flexibility within the affective subsystem.

Here

flexibility is one reaction to intrusive stimuli.

Within

their theory, apparent comfort with contradictory stimuli
or interference describes flexibility.

This study, in

contrast, does not define flexibility in terms of affect
or motivation (or at least affect alone).
Wardell and Royce propose that motivational
(tolerance for the unconventional and constricted versus
flexible) and emotional (reflection versus impulsivity
and physiognomic versus literal) substyles contribute to
rational, empirical, and metaphoric higher-order affec
tive styles.
It has been acknowledged that cognitive mosaics
and cognitive flexibility are involved in other subsys
tems.

In fact, other researchers' descriptions of "flex

ible" individuals (see page 41) include apparent ease
with emotional expression.

It is not unexpected.
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therefore, that Wardell and Royce's affective substyles
also reflect characteristics of cognitive flexiblity or
parallel descriptions of cognitive mosaics.
The affective substyles in which these charac
teristics are noted are as follows;
Tolerance for the unconventional—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

reflects an "'. . . acceptance of experiences
which do not agree with what one knows to be
true"

(Gardner, Holzman, Klein, Linton, &

Spence, 1959).
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects that aspect of cognitive style
associated with cognitive flexibility.
Constricted versus flexible—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This is

associated with automization and ability to
cope with interference.
(Association with proposed paradigm):

As

noted on the previous page, the use of the
affective style subsystem and some of the
traits of this style differ in certain aspects
from the proposed study.

For instance, Wardell

and Royce define "constricted" individuals as
those showing more aspiration to overcome
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contradictory stimuli.

This study would assign

this characteristic to "flexible” individuals.
Reflection versus impulsivity—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

involves the amount of alternative hypotheses
involved in problem analysis.
(Association with proposed paradigm);
Reflection involves that part of cognitive
style associated with cognitive flexibility.
Physiognomic versus literal—
(Wardell and Royce definition):

This

represents the preference for the dynamic and
emotional versus literal aspects of objects and
ideas.
(Association with proposed paradigm):
This reflects that part of cognitive style
associated with the cognitive mosaic compo
nents .
The constricted versus flexible control substyle
makes up the rational affective style.

Tolerance for the

unconventional and reflection versus impulsivity substyles make up the empirical affective style.

And meta

phoric, the third higher-order affective style, consists
of the physiognomic versus literal substyle.
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These substyles or characteristics relate to
cognitive abilities and/or affective traits.

They also

underlie the rational, empirical, and metaphoric styles
at the cognitive-affective style level.

This study does

not concern itself with labeling or delineating these
system's styles, but the above does compare/contrast with
the proposed theory.
The proposed paradigm draws on the subsystems
viewpoint and the dynamic nature of the personality.

It

also parallels the Wardell and Royce model on the sub
style characteristics— certain characteristics that make
up a cognitive style relate to flexibility or the mosa
ics.

The same applies to the affective domain.
On other points, the two models do not contrast

nor necessarily agree with each other.

Here the dif

ference is one of focus.
On yet other points, the model and paradigm
differ in their explanation or viewpoints.

For instance,

this study's definition of flexibility (as operationally
defined by Golden in his Stroop Color and Word Test
manual,

1978)

is original with this study.

Whereas,

Wardell and Royce define flexibility in terms of an
affective style, this study views flexibility in terms of
cognitive mosaics— a dynamic combination creating cogni
tive style.
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Another difference involves the dynamics within
the subsystems.

Wardell and Royce propose that values

are more closely tied with the affective subsystem,
whereas styles are more closely connected with the cogni
tive subsystem.
arrows

In contrast, it is proposed that all

(connectors between the subsystems— see Figure

4, page 22) represent equal energy or influence.
These differences, both of a global and more
detail-oriented nature, combine with both supportive and
neutral aspects to better reflect the proposed paradigm.
In summary, the model and the paradigm do not
agree on all points of interest (often simply due to
differences in foci).

The Wardell and Royce theory,

however, does provide both a framework within which the
proposed paradigm takes form and support for the theory
and chosen hypotheses.
While credit goes to Wardell and Royce for their
contributions to the study, the reader should note that
cognitive mosaics, this study's definition of cognitive
flexibility, and related theory are original with this
research paradigm.
In summary,

it is believed that the differences

between the model and the paradigm do not detract from
support of the study.

Instead, it more clearly outlines

and defines the theory and background for the research
and the potential for empirical investigation.
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Robert Ornstein*s "Multiminds”
Ornstein goes beyond the popular "two brain"— two
mind theme to a multimind view.

He claims that there are

many minds which are specialized and come into play as
necessary by situational demands.

Ornstein explains

incognizance of this situation in terms of limited con
sciousness— only one mind operates, even though briefly,
at a time within one's awareness.

Here the mind con

sists of a number of minds, each a mixed structure of
functions which operate to simplify information.
Ornstein delineates a hierarchical structure with
an independent ability of governing which organizes,
infers,

interprets, and controls the mind processes.

fails to be omnipotent, however,

It

in that lower minds may

operate instead of minds higher in the hierarchy which
are more adaptive to experiential demands. The lower
levels within the structure are rigid in contrast to
higher functions which are more "intelligent" and flexi
ble.
As minds develop, capacity to meet environmental
demands increases within the "governing" capacities and
within a margin of error— a margin of error occurs when
the wrong mind, as it were, steps in to process.
While he sees these minds as evolutionary,
Ornstein states that experience can strengthen mental
operating control and increase an individual's ability to
choose higher order minds instead of reactive, smaller
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minds.

This aspect, in addition to a concept of multiple

minds, supports similar aspects (mosaics)

in the proposed

paradigm.
The proposed paradigm stands in partial contrast
to this theory since cognitive flexibility focuses on
movement within process-oriented mosaics rather than
Ornstein's intra-mind flexibility.

While Ornstein pre

supposes flexibility between these minds, he views this
as an absolute and sometimes inappropriate, intrapsychic
movement.
He differs from the proposed paradigm in that he
appears to outline a more inclusive personality aspect in
his "minds" concept and that the minds appear within a
consciousness/unconsciousness framework rather than a
personality infrastructure.
These differences, however, did not detract from
the foundation upholding the hypotheses and the paradigm
proposed here.
Proposed conceptual paradigm
of personality
The proposed paradigm consists of a hierarchy of
many mosaics involving cognitive components.

The ability

to move within these mosaics enhances biological and
psychological adaptation and survival.

These mosaics can

be used in describing the relationship, development, and
regression involving flexibility and moral reasoning.
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The relationship described.

While described

earlier (see Chapter 1), this section reiterates the
suggested relationship between cognitive flexibility and
moral reasoning for the ease of understanding.
The research focused essentially on the cognitive
subsystem of the personality and on flexibility within
cognitive mosaics or patterns.
This researcher defines cognitive flexibility as
the ability to move from one pattern to another and to
create other patterns as needed.

It forms the core of

the paradigm and describes the individual interacting
with the environment.
The types and usage of patterns exist within the
cognitive subsystem of the personality, yet influence
other aspects of personality and behavior.
The cognitive subsystem of the personality, in
turn, influences aspects of style and the value subsys
tems.

Moral reasoning develops and exists within a

fusion of cognitive flexibility in the cognitive subsys
tem and the value subsystem.
Moral reasoning pertains to those kinds of opera
tions involving cognitive components to make decisions
regarding the the "right" and "wrong" of behaviors.

As

such, it involves the value subsystem in the Wardell and
Royce model (see Figure 4 page 22).

Some individuals

(e.g.. Conn, 1987) claim that higher moral reasoning,
its usage of empathy,

in

involves a cognitive-affective
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operation (e.g., Thomson, 1989).

This researcher agrees

with this, and believes that the personality subsystems
function within an interacting system.

This is not,

however, a matter of concern to this dissertation.

From

these and other integrated systems, the personality
develops.
Human development.

Both cognition and moral

reasoning show qualitatively different phases in develop
ment over time and experience.

Piaget, Kohlberg, and

many others (Comalli, Wapner, & Werner, 1962; Goldstein,
et al., 1978) support this aspect of development.

While

Piaget did not believe in regression of his broad stages,
Kohlberg and researchers in other cognitive areas report
regression in reasoning/cognition.
Regression in the two concepts.

A further paral

lel of the relation between flexibility and moral reason
ing within the paradigm exists in the noted regression
(pages 3-4) and the following studies under stressful
situations.
Serino (1977) researched the interaction between
DIT scores and cognitive frustration.

While he found

insignificant effects, £ (2,6) = 3.56, p > .05, he argues
that regression remains possible within moral reasoning.
In contrast, Kohlberg and Kramer (cited in Rest,
1986) report regression in moral reasoning under the
stress of a college experience.

However, this and other
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studies do not provide the support for this research as
is found in studies on cognition.
In one study on cognition, Larcom (cited in
Serino, 1977)

found significant interaction between

frustration and regression of cognitive abilities on a
given task.

Broverman and Lazarus (1958)

found that

task-induced stress reduced cognitive functions, with
weaker cognitive "subsystems" temporarily unused.

(In

terms of this paradigm, such weaker systems ma y include
those less practiced, younger, higher-order, and more
flexible mosaics).

Here these researchers describe

"cognitive subsystems" as inherent tendencies of function
which maintain organization while processing interfering
stimuli— this necessitates flexibility or results in
regression.
Using a modified Stroop Test, Commali, Wapner,
and Werner (1962) reported a significant relationship
E

< .01 between age and interference/flexibility scores.

They report increasing flexibility with age, a leveling
off during adulthood, and a decrease in flexibility with
older ages.

They interpret the results of old age as

lessened differentiation and hierarchical control— in
other words, regression.

While results with the elderly

(e.g., Rush, Panek, & Russell,

1987) may actually reflect

increased stress in many areas of living, it is best not
to speculate on this aspect within the paradigm or
changes or lack of change in morality after the age of
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65.

This study defines moral maturity in terms of adult

hood (peak) flexibility.
The proposed paradigm interprets these studies in
terms of intra-individual flexibility and stress.

With

stress, those individuals who show less cognitive flexi
bility may regress to a basic mosaic, but a mosaic that
proves inappropriate given the individual's biological
and psychological maturity.
Perhaps the inappropriate aspects of such pro
cessing result, in part, from the lesser usage of affec
tive data, number of stimuli, and variety of external/
internal cues seen in less flexible subjects.

This study

proposes that it is the unique qualities of flexibility
that provide the necessary processing capabilities for
higher order moral reasoning; higher order moral reason
ing requires the ability to analyze a wide variety of
data from diverse angles.
This conceptualization justifies the necessity of
flexibility in higher moral reasoning without it neces
sarily being the only factor involved in such develop
ment.

This idea, in addition to parallels in development

and regression, describes the proposed paradigm in terms
of the research hypotheses.

This paradigm, the theory

posited by Wardell and Royce, and Ornstein's recent
"multiminds" substantiate theoretical support of the
study.

In moving from theoretical support to research
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the following sections explore relevant studies in the
area of cognitive flexiblity and moral reasoning.
Cognitive Flexibility
Exploration of cognitive flexibility must include
a definition of the term and discussion of related
research classified under cognitive controls, cognitive
styles, and metacognition terminology.

Each area,

in

turn, adds to the understanding of this complex con
struct .
Defined
While cognitive flexibility exists as a construct
within research and theory, its name and theoretical
structure sometimes differs with individual researchers.
Here the term cognitive flexibility is defined as the
capacity to move from one pattern to another and to
create new patterns as needed.
This study restricted flexibility to cognition
and to the construct measured by the Stroop Color and
Word Test.

Golden (1978) says that the Stroop Test mea

sures the basic ability to "select relevant information
from one's environment in a flexible manner...such an
individual is better able...to adapt to new circumstance
to more effectively function in general."

The inter

ference score, used in this study, ". . .is thought to
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measure a pure dimension of cognitive flexbility"
(Golden, 1978).
On defining cognitive flexibility in terms of
personality, reference is made to Wardell and Royce
(1978) who describe a dynamic,

integrated personality

consisting of subsystems and consider flexibility
within the stvle subsystem.

This study restricted flexi

bility to the cognitive system.

It does use, however,

the same theory of personality and definitions of subsys
tems.

The following represents a summation of important,

related work.
Cognitive controls
Cognitive controls, proposed by Klein (Gardner,
Holzman, Klein, Linton, & Spence, 1959; Klein,

1970), are

stable modes of interacting with the environment.
Ludwig (1981) further defines such controls as conflict
free, non-defensive aspects of the ego structure.
Proposed controls consist of flexibility-constriction,
leveling-sharpening, and equivalence range.

Hartman

(cited in Ludwig, 1981) defines controls as independent,
innate capacities which develop according to the
increasing demands as an individual grows older.
Controls, therefore, are adaptive functions, and
all of these equate with a person's cognitive style
(Hartman, 1951; Klein,

1970).
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Researchers (e.g., Gardner et al., 1959; Klein,
1970; Moran, 1984) use the Stroop Test to contrast sub
jects chiefly using the flexible pole of the cognitive
control versus subjects employing the constricted aspect.
These studies report that those classified as constricted
by Stroop measurements appeared to dislike ambiguity,
utilized few feelings in consciousness, had more apparent
difficulty in communicating with others, and categorized
reality through cognition rather than through both cogni
tive and affective means.
Apparent ease of expression of affect,

indif

ference to ambiguity, and other contrasts described those
labeled flexible by their performance on the Stroop Test.
The flexibility-constricted control exists as one among
several functions.

As mentioned earlier, this grouping

of employed patterns leads to the next distinction— that
of cognitive style.
Cognitive stvle
The construct cognitive style pertains to "the
course of adaptation to particular situations"
Klein,

1953, p. 183).

(Smith &

In other words, the type and

unique usage of particular collective patterns make up
the cognitive styles.
While cognitive styles develop slowly through
experience (Messich, 1976), some researchers refer to
these styles as relatively stable over both time and
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situations (Gardner, 1953; Messich,
1953).

1976; Smith & Klein,

Showing the overlap between cognitive and other

subsystem flexibility, Messich (1976) includes flexi
bility as one dimension of the cognitive style.
The definitions of researchers (Broverman &
Lazarus, 1958; Broverman, 1960a; Broverman, 1960b;
Broverman & Lazarus, 1964; Dockett,

1968; Gardner,

1953;

Goldstein & Blademan, 1978) describe a consistent,
inclusive aspect of the personality which maintains an
active relationship with the environment.
Definition of cognitive flexibility now moves to
educational application under the term, metacognition.
Metacoanition
In that it is believed that an individual's
unique experiences and genetics form cognitive style, it
cannot be taught.

However,

formal environmental training

fosters it through the use of cognitive strategies.

Such

strategies are found in the area of metacognition in
educational research.

Flavell (cited in Wang & Richarde,

1985) describes metacognitive knowledge as a learner's
self-awareness as to what can or cannot be done cogni
tively.

Moreover, the following research supports the

likelihood that self-awareness can be learned.
Control,

in addition to awareness, brings this

term closer to cognitive flexibility.

Educators and

other theorists imbue metacognition with the ability to
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direct processing of information and behavior to one or
the other hemispheres according to task requirements
(Hall & Esposito, 1984; Holowinsky, 1984; Way, 1985).
The proposed paradigm differs in not segmenting
the systems under control.

In the depiction of mosaics

involving the brain as a whole, it differs from the hemi
spheric emphasis still employed by some theorists.

It

would further emphasize the accessing quality of the
control— Moore (1982) comes closest with his inclusion of
reflective and multiple access in his definition of
metacognition.
While debate over the metacognition construct
exists (Holowinsky, 1984), research continues (e.g.,
Moore,
1985) .

1982; Slife, 1985; Wang & Richarde, 1985; Way,
As noted, this present construct does not agree

with certain conceptualizations of metacognition.

Fur

thermore, unlike the more application-oriented studies,
this study is an exploration of the paradigm's dynamic
structure.
Other related research
Mention may be made of other studies which are
indirectly related to this research.

These studies

include exploration of experts versus novices (Glaser,
1985), automization (Broverman & Lazarus, 1964; Hartman,
1951), and training in response widening (Kane & Arnold,
1986).
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The StrooD Color and Word Test
The Stroop Color and Word Test, based on Ligon's
(Ligon, 1932; Stroop,

1935) color-naming theory, has been

used in personality, cognitive, and psychodiagnostic
research and with populations of adults, children, developmentally disabled, and those diagnosed with mental
disorders.
The test consists of three timed sections. The
first involves reading the names of colors printed in
black ink on white in a 5 by 20 matrix.

The second

consists of reading the colors in a 5 by 2 0 matrix.

The

last part consists of reading the color of the ink in
which the words are printed, not the word shown.

For

instance, the person would say "blue" when the word "red"
was printed in blue ink.
matrix.

This also exists in a 5 by 20

A formula involving these sections produces a

flexibility score.
While exact administration and scoring procedures
have differed among researchers in the past, a standard
ized manual now exists.

The instrument is prepared for

either individual or group administration.

Chapter 3

includes procedures used in this research.
Important studies using the Stroop Test have been
mentioned, and hundreds of others exist.

Researchers

report mixed results of the Stroop Test relative to
various aspects of personality (Callaway,
1971; Jensen,

1965; Lowe, 1985, Ludwig,

1959; Hochman,

1981; Podell &
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Phillips, 1959; Rush, Panek, & Russell, 1987; Stein &
Langer, 1966; Thurstone & Mellinger,

1953; Williams &

Nulty, 1986; etc.).
Broverman and Lazarus (1964), however, report
pertinent information in reference to personality regard
ing the relationship between results on the Stroop Test
and two projective tests, the Thematic Apperception Test
and the Rorschach Test.

They found significant correla^

tions between scores on the Stroop Test and the number of
highly integrated responses and indications of ego
strength in the two projectives.
Another important study focusing on personality
(Stein & Langer,

1966) compared personality characteris

tics with flexibility scores on a variant of the Stroop
Test (Color Phonetic Symbol Test— covert incongruity as
compared to the Stroop Test's overt incongruity).

These

researchers report low cognitive interference from the
incongruity of the Stroop Test and significantly higher
intra- and interpersonal effectiveness.
If the level of anxiety and the coping mechanisms
affects, in part, an individual's efficacy, then the
following study finds similar results.

Dawkins and

Furnham (1989) explored those using a repressive coping
process and low and high anxious individuals.

Those

classified as high anxiety on the State-Trait Anxiety
Inventory showed a decrement in performance compared to
the low anxious group, but did better than those
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classified as using repressive coping styles by the
Marlowe-Crown Social Desirability Scale.
Wapner and Warner (cited in Stein & Langer,

1966)

compared scores on this same instrument with the Adjust
ment Check list and report significantly less psychologi
cal disturbance and less deviation in personality with
higher flexibility scores.

Thus, the value of the Stroop

Test in personality research depends on the aspect of
personality under investigation and the other instrument
being used.
Another construct studied with the Stroop Test is
cognition.

Studies examining possible relationships

between its scores and cognition include cognitive con
trol studies, discussed above, and other research.
Jensen and Rohwer (1966)

found no significant relation

ship between color naming speed and intelligence, nor
between flexibility scores and intelligence.
however,

He did,

find a significant correlation between word

naming and intelligence (p < .01).
Wheeler (1977) studied brain functioning involved
in the interference-flexibility scores.

He found that

when college students were asked to respond with pushing
buttons instead of silent or audible verbal responses,
the Stroop Test interference reaction disappeared!
Moreover, this occurred with usage of either hand.

This

researcher and others (e.g., MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988;
Nealis, 1973) note the competition of tasks involved in
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creating the "novel" situation— the third Stroop task
must involve conflict along a dimension of meaning in
order for a new type of processing to occur.

The con

flict comes in responding to the color of the ink used
for a word versus the meaning of the word itself.
Individual responses to this processing results in dif
ferences in flexibility scores.

When used according to

the manual's directions, the Stroop Test produces sig
nificant interference scores— even when answers are
unspoken (Wheeler, 1977).
While the Wheeler (1977) study explored using
dominant versus non-dominant hands, others have looked to
investigating differences between the hemispheres them
selves.
7-15

Koenig (1989), using 108 right-handed males of
years of age, found that there was a right-visual

field advantage for all age groups.
Exploring the hemispheres introduces advances in
the practice and research of the Stroop Test in the area
of neuropsychology.

Its value as part of a thorough

neuropsychological battery is recognized at Crownsville
Hospital Center in Maryland and other providers of mental
health care services.
The Stroop Test's contribution to the battery is
its acknowledged reflection of frontal lobe processing—
that area associated with higher reasoning functions.
Frontal dysfunction differences between those with
schizophrenic versus affective (depressive and/or manic-
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depressive) processes were studied by Tal (1989) and
Todd (1989).

Both studies indicated that these disorders

showed significant frontal lobe dysfunction as measured
by the Stroop Test and other instrumentation.
Other neuropsychological research comes under
topics of memory (Pickering, 1990) and cognitive inhibi
tion (Beech, 1990), and general studies of brain dysfunc
tion diagnosis (e.g.. Das, 1970; Golden, 1978; Ferret,
1974) .

The Stroop Test, therefore, is used as one mea

sure of higher reasoning within the context of normal
brain functioning.
Of interest in all psychological/neuropsychologi
cal testing, Sheehan, Donovan, and MacLeod (1988) note
that the Stroop interference effect is "notoriously
difficult to modulate".

Under hypnosis, they found that

the Stroop effect increased.

However, when the role of

the hypnotist included assisting the subject in focusing
attention on the novel task, those highly susceptible to
hypnosis showed a sharp reduction of the Stroop effect,
whereas those with lower susceptibility experienced only
slight reduction of the effect.
Other areas studied include creativity, where
Golden (1978) found a significant relationship between
creativity and scores on the Stroop Test.

Additional

studies include drug-related research (Hooker & Jones,
1987; McKeon,

1986; Ragade,

1990), autonomic nervous

system (Frankenhaeuser et al., 1967; Houston, 1969; Oken
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et al., 1962; Regard, 1983), hormone levels (Franken
haeuser et al., 1967),

interactions with nutrition (Nayak

& Dash, 1987; Channon, Hensley, & deSilva, 1988) and many
more. The Stroop Test has been used with varying popula
tions (e.g., Hama & Hashimoto,

1985; Karchmer,

1981;

Watts, McKenna, Sharrock, & Trezie, 1986; Yamazaki,
and under varying conditions
Sharp,

1985)

(e.g., Connor, Franzen,

1988; Hugdahl & Franzor,

&

1987; MacKinnon, Geisel-

man, & Woodward, 1985; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988; Sheehan,
Donovan, & MacLeod, 1988; Smith & Broadbent, 1985; Wil
liams, & Broadbent,

1986; Williams & Nultry,

1986), and

by researchers from several fields of investigation.
There is a Chinese (Ji & Jiao, 1987) and a German
version of the Stroop Test

(Hunger, Leplow, & Kleim,

1987) , and a substantial number of modified Stroop tests
(Cook, Jones, & Johnston,
Moore,

1989; Foreman, Barraclough,

& Mehta, 1989; Hayashi,

1988; Mogg, Mathews,

Weinman, 1989; Richards & Millwood,

&

1989) used in pain,

anxiety, and a myriad of other research interests.
Continuing research also considers the Stroop
effect itself, hypothesizing about the factors and pro
cesses involved (Franzen,

1989; MacLeod & Dunbar, 1988;

Panek, 1985).
Established usage of the instrument supported
utilization in this study.

It does not, however,

replace reliability and validity data (see Chapter 3).
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Moral Reasoning
There is much current research and theory for
mulation within the area of moral development, reasoning,
and behavior.

In view of the great quantity of existing

studies, and in relation to the proposed paradigm, this
researcher focuses on moral reasoning theory and research
employing the DIT.

Moral reasoning must be defined,

explored in terms of pertinent research, and described in
terms of the Defining Issues Test.
Defined
As mentioned earlier (see page 6), moral reason
ing involves those kinds of operations using cognitive
components to make decisions regarding the "right" and
"wrong" of behaviors.
Many theorists and researchers have explored
moral reasoning and incorporated the concept in studies,
educational theories (e.g., Blakeney & Blakeney,
DeVuyst, 1989; Gielen,

1990;

1987; Vokey, 1990); other theories

(e.g., Wilson, 1990), and philosophies.

Early work with

moral reasoning includes Baldwin's writings (published at
the turn of the century) and Piaget's work (published
1932)

(Boom, 1989) both of whom focused on cognition and

development.

Also using a cognitive-developmental ap

proach, Kohlberg researched the concept using justice as
a basis for moral reasoning (1958, 1986).
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A summation of Kohlberg*s theory
Kohlberg researched and authored much of the
current theory on moral reasoning.

He fully admits that

he never considered that his work would represent a
universal theory; he also declared that he himself was
not an example of his highest stage of moral maturity!
His dissertation,

"The Development of Modes of Moral

Thinking and Choice in the Years 10 to 16" (1958) is but
one exposition of his model development and research.
Kohlberg's research and theorizing developed from
his questioning of an earlier event in which he was
involved.

During a lecture in Tokyo he spoke of his

experiences in illegally transporting Jews to post-World
War II Israel and the questions he had regarding all
areas of human dignity and justice.

Kohlberg stated that

"Equal respect for human dignity seemed to me the essence
of justice"

(1986, p. 6).

Within his dissertation he

described six moral types, evaluating them by eight
characteristics (values, choice, sanction, negative
standards or rules, self-image and role, authority, con
tent, and justice).
These types or stages can be outlined as follows
(parentheses identify labels used in his 1958 disserta
tion) :
Level I:
Stage 1

Premoral (Premoral Level)
punishment and obedience
(heteronomous type)
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Stage 2
Level II:

instrumental-relativist
(hedonistic egoism)
Conventional
Level)

(Generalized Conformity

Stage 3

"good boy/good girl"
("good boy" orientation)

Stage 4

law and order
(type 3)

Level III:

Principle (Autonomous Level)

Stage 5

social contract
(democratic legalists)

Stage 6

universal ethical principles
(conscience)

Kohlberg (197 3) later suggested a seventh stage,
but full development and inclusion of this stage never
occurred.

Carter (1987) claims that this Kohlbergian

stage shifts the emphasis from justice to agape love and
an understanding of the cosmic perspective.

Carter,

however, argues that Kohlberg's stage seven is the
foundation of all moral stages— not a stage higher and
separable from preceding stages.
Kohlberg reported (1986) that over 50 crosscultural studies had produced the following:

stages one

through four are found in most societies, and stage five
is found in urban societies with sophisticated systems of
education, rather than in less-sophisticated societies.
Prior to his death, Kohlberg lectured, worked for
the development of democratic programs in high schools,
and did other important work within the moral reasoning
field.

While he admitted that he was still learning from
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experience, he claimed that, "I'm beginning to think I
have something to say"

(1986, p. 10).

Theoretical additions to Kohlberg
Gilligan's theory (Brabeck, 1987; Conn, 1987;
Gilligan & Attanucci,
Bardige,

1988; Gilligan, Ward, Taylor,

1989; Sprinthall,

&

1987), supplementing

Kohlberg*s, suggests that subjective attachment proves a
more appropriate basis of evaluating moral maturity for
the female population.

She further asserts that there

are different moralities and moral psychologies between
the sexes (Brabeck, 1987).

Gielen (1987), however,

asserts that Gilligan's work overlooked statistical
information.

Gielen cites Thoma and Rest's (1985) analy

sis of 6,000 subjects from 56 DIT studies which clearly
fails to support Gilligan's allegations.
Brabeck (1987) cites meta-analysis, longitudinal
research, and reviews (e.g., Brabeck,
the sex bias claim,

1983)

in countering

instead stating that any noted dif

ferences exist due to differences in educational and work
experience in the samples.
This area of inquiry remains controversial and
under continued research.

Sprinthall

(1987), however,

anticipates that an increasing "thaw" of the definition
of morality will incorporate the information and orienta
tion of Gilligan.
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Joy represents one of several theorists, rather
than researchers, who build new perspectives on
Kohlberg's foundations (Joy, 1983) and/or view his ideas
from a different perspective.

While Joy agrees that

justice is the basis for moral reasoning, he adds to
Kohlberg's structure the concepts of (1) noumenal func
tion,

(2) God,

(3) faith, and (4) the acceptance of

"evil" in individuals.

Joy, however, questions the

equating of immorality with underdevelopment.

Instead,

he theorizes that morality exists apart from God and that
the inclusion of free will necessitates the understanding
of moral failure.

This Wesleyan curriculum planner is

but one of several theorists to re-formulate Kohlbergian
theory.
Schmidt (1983), speaking from a Lutheran perspec
tive, is less generous with Kohlberg.

Schmidt claims

that Kohlberg has become a substitute for the gospel, and
as such he is an "offense."

He also points out the need

for recognizing motivation for moral reasoning; he cites
the gospel as such a force.
Such a supernatural power is in Moore's analysis
(1983).

She cites perception and knowledge from God as

energizers, and she further points out that Kohlberg's
work considers only thinking, apparently omitting feeling
and doing.

Moving beyond Kohlberg, Sholl (1983) proposes

that Christian relational strengths constitute a more
appropriate basis for moral reasoning than justice.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

55
Because of the nature of the moral reasoning construct,
these perspectives provide material for interesting
dialogue.
The religious background of these theorists does
suggest, however, an underlying theme of addition— that
of the power behind moral reasoning.

Perhaps many of the

contentions above spring from Kohlberg's views on the
progressive and innately motivated development of m o r a l '
reasoning.

Is Kohlberg, indeed, naive in his assumption?

Does the omission of God present insurmountable difficul
ties in his theory?

The theorists above provide addi

tional perspectives and possible extensions of Kohlber
gian conceptualizations.
This study focused on moral reasoning, which
innately involves a cognitive operation, rather than on
behavior.

Moreover, a striving for growth is considered

inborn with natural and supernatural influences towards
development, tempered by experience and choice.

As such,

this researcher asserts that Kohlberg's theory remains an
adequate foundation for instrumentation.
Possible addendums are acknowledged.

For

example, Turiel (cited in Thomas, 1989), Gert (cited in
Thomas,

1989), Gilligan (cited in Brabeck, 1987; Conn,

1987; Gilligan & Attanuci,

1988; Killen,

1987; Thomas,

1989), Perry (Thomas, 1989), and Rest (see below), are
just some of the other theorists and/or researchers who
add to the ideas offered by Kohlberg.
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While these individuals theorize, research,
write, and have their varied critics and supporters, some
moral reasoning analysts claim that these individuals
need not compete with each other.
another's work.

Nor do they negate one

Instead, they merely add dimensions and

emphases to Kohlbergian theory (e.g., Sprinthall,

1987).

Their theories and possible delimitations of the Kohlber
gian foundation of the DIT, therefore, are not considered
to be limitations to this research.
Rest *s contributions to
moral reasoning
In addition to developing the Defining Issues
Test, James Rest has researched and/or authored articles,
books, and sections of books on moral reasoning.

Rest

explored the hierarchical nature of moral reasoning, the
components of moral reasoning, and the development of an
instrument different from Kohlberg's interview.
Rest's research (1973) supported the hierarchical
nature of moral reasoning.

He used the DIT, with

Kohlberg's interview as a pre-testing instrument.

Rest

found that a level of comprehension of statements tended
to cluster around a particular stage, that comprehension
of moral statements was cumulative (subjects understood
those statements from previous stages— that comprehension
increased without taking away understanding of previous
stages), and that comprehension fell progressively with
stages of higher moral reasoning.

Rest, Turiel, and
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Kohlberg (1969)

found significantly higher comprehension

of one stage rather than two stages above an individual's
reasoning (based on Kohlberg Interview).
In addition. Rest reports that responses to the
four dilemmas, rated in respect to Kohlbergian stages,
showed statistically significant age discrimination on
stages one through four (Carroll & Rest,

1981).

Inter

estingly, the study also found a rejection of lower
stages with increasing age.

Obviously this involved more

than an aspect of moral reasoning comprehension.
Rest

(Rest, 1973; Rest, Turiel,

& Kohlberg, 1969)

explains moral reasoning in terms of preference and
comprehension.

Comprehension sets the upper limits of

moral reasoning; preference sets the lower limits of
moral reasoning acceptable to the individual.

Rest's

(1973) research supports both concepts within a develop
mental framework.
Corresponding to these components of moral rea
soning, Rest's model involves four processes:
evaluation,
tions,

(1) moral

(2) interpretation of morally relevant situa

(3) setting priorities (the first three reflecting

the usage of cognitive mosaics), and (4) implementation
of plan of action (Gielen, 1987).

He states that the DIT

focuses on moral evaluation among these processes.
Beyond these contributions. Rest developed the
Defining Issues Test— a test shown to be more than just
another variant of Kohlberg's interview (Davison &
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Robbins,

1978). The Defining Issues Test consists of six

vignettes designed to measure moral reasoning.

The

instrument can be given to large groups of individuals,
with each individual rating and ranking statements per
taining to the vignettes.

The scores provide a group

stage profile, a consistency check, two indices of moral
judgment development, and other information depending on
the needs of the researcher.
While research (Rest, Cooper, Coder, Masanz, &
Anderson, 1974) showed a correlation (r = .68) between
the DIT and Kohlberg's Moral Judgment Interview, and
although both claim to measure the same construct, the
DIT is a unique instrument.

It differs from Kohlberg's

instrument in both methodology and on theoretical
issues.
For instance, differences include usage of spon
taneous (Kohlberg) versus standardized statements (DIT),
subjective researcher scorings (Kohlberg) versus objec
tive researcher scorings

(DIT), labeling (Kohlberg)

versus overall index of moral maturity (DIT), no validity
measure (Kohlberg) versus the M check (DIT), and other
contrasts which clearly support the individuality of the
DIT— a uniqueness supported by other researchers.
Related studies involving the DIT
In addition to studies mentioned earlier, other
research includes exploration of moral reasoning, as
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defined by the Defining Issues Test, and cognitive/
personality constructs.
One such study explored the relationship between
Piagetian cognitive stages and moral development in
adolescents in a necessary but not sufficient hypothesis
(Howard, 1986).

In this case a necessary but not suffi

cient relationship means that cognitive development must
reach certain Piagetian cognitive levels in order for
certain levels of moral reasoning to potentially develop.
The "potential" term refers to the fact that the level of
cognitive development is not the only factor involved in
higher moral development.

Cognitive development is

necessary but not sufficient to produce higher moral
development.

Their hypothesis held for the formal opera

tional, but not for the concrete operational stage among
adolescents (scores from instruments measuring cognitive
factors did not significantly predict moral reasoning
scores).
Couch (1986) examined this same assumption using
a deaf population with mixed results.

Similarly, other

studies (Adams, 1987; Weiss, 1986) show mixed results
depending on the instrumentation and focus of study.
Studies comparing the DIT and IQ found correla
tions as high as .60's and .70's (Rest, 1979); however,
the studies above do not support equating moral reasoning
with cognition.

In other words, cognition does not

explain nor account for moral reasoning.

It merely
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supports the understanding of a necessary but not suffi
cient relationship between cognition and moral reasoning.
This study, was concerned with an interaction between the
value and cognitive subsystems, and not just the cogni
tive subsystem itself.
Of a practical nature, Schaefli, Rest, and Thoma,
(1985) used the DIT to explore various methods of moral
reasoning training.

Using junior/senior high school,

college/graduate students, and other adults, they found
that dilemma discussion and psychological development
programs of 3 - 12 weeks produced significant increases
in moral reasoning.

They found that social studies and

humanities courses did not show this effect.

Of the

programs that did work, it worked best with those 24
years of age and older.
Along the lines of training, some research has
addressed moral reasoning among therapists— one of the
experiences which prompted this study.
Reeves, Bowman, and Cooley

For instance.

(1989) explored the relation

ship between client's moral reasoning level and the
empathy expressed by counseling students.

They found

that higher moral reasoning counseling students showed
significantly higher empathy responses to lower versus
higher moral reasoning client statements.
The moral reasoning of both the client and the
counselor, therefore,

is related to the amount of empathy

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

61
exhibited by the counselor.
study, unfortunately,

Due to the nature of the

it cannot be said that high moral

reasoning is a prerequisite to high empathy responses.
Fortunately, however, Curtis, Billingslea, and
Wilson,

(1988) used the California Psychological Inven

tory Empathy and Socialization scales, a questionnaire
which rated types of authority, and the DIT with 105
undergraduates.

They found that subjects obtaining high

empathy and socialization scores also exhibited higher
moral reasoning.

They also report that the individuals

with higher moral reasoning tended to visualize author
ity/ "authority figures" in a negative manner.

These

statements will prove important in the applications of
this study in Chapter 5.
Authority and related implications have also been
an issue of discussion/debate within the area of reli
gion. Cullman (1989) hypothesized that more mature
individuals will express less need for formal religion.
Her research hypothesis was supported— religiousity was
negatively correlated with psychological maturity as
measured by the DIT, Religious Belief-Behavior Question
naire, Bond Defense Style Questionnaire, and Valliant's
Semi-structured Interview Schedule.

Religiousity was

found to be an important factor in both moral and emo
tional maturity.

Cullman even suggested that religious

ity may hinder maturity.
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Some individuals have questioned the usage of the
DIT instrument with certain religious populations.

They

charge that the DIT is biased so that individuals within
these populations receive lower moral reasoning scores.
The question is valid.

Buier, Butman, Burwell, and Van

Wicklin (1989), however, report that norms of both a
cross-sectional and longitudinal nature at three Chris
tian colleges were within general college DIT norms.
Looking not at just the population, but at an
evaluation of the items on the DIT, Richards

(1989)

explored the test using 833 members of a Mormon church
and 822 general population subjects.

Richards reports

that his interpretation suggests that 25 out of the 72
DIT items are biased for this population and that this
population scored within low moral reasoning P score (the
P score uses just moral reasoning stage 5 and 6 respon
ses) ranges on the DIT.

However, when these items were

removed, the P score differences did not fully disappear.
In support of the DIT, Richards did not find any
difference between the Mormon versus other subject popu
lation on the D score (the D score is a weighted combina
tion of all moral reasoning stage responses) of the DIT.
It is important to note that he feels that the D score
does not underestimate the moral reasoning of this con
servative religious group.

Current literature appears to
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favor usage of the D score on the DIT.

This research

adds further empirical support of this usage.
Other studies examined locus of control
(Bloomberg,

1974; Carey, 1990; Howard, 1986), the

relationships between dimensions of psychopathology
(Hunter, 1985; Mohr,

1987), parent socialization

(Alvarez, 1986; Finn, 1978; Forder, 1973), affect (Aron,
1972, Conn, 1987; Sturtevant, 1986), self-concept (Kelly.
& Choven,

1985), education (Bebeau & Brabeck,

1987;

Blumenfeld, Pintrich, & Hamilton, 1987; Bouhmama, 1988;
Bowman & Allen,

1988; Gfellner, 1986; James,

Johnston & Lubomudrov,

1984;

1987; Keith, 1987; Kuhmerker,

1988; Okatahi & Parish, 1987; Rest, 1987; Shaver,
Thoma & Rest,

1987;

1987) , culture and/or race (Boyes & Walker,

1988; Locke & Tucker,

1988; Moon, 1986; Zeidner, 1988),

and other personality and/or cognitive dimensions
(Harris, Mussen, & Rutherford, 1976; Lawrence, 1987; Page
& Handley, 1988).

These studies comprise just a limited

listing of research conducted with a wide variety of
populations.
The studies cited above, in general, do not
involve moral reasoning in a personality paradigm.
are concerned,

They

instead, with describing populations in

terms of moral reasoning, relationships of moral reason
ing to major,

isolated constructs, and analyzing methods
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of training. As such, however, they provide foundational
knowledge regarding constructs in the proposed paradigm.
The area of moral reasoning remains popular and
the review above represents an overview of the areas
under investigation and those of relevance to the
research.
Summary of Literature Review and
Theoretical Background
Related research and theoretical work supports
choice of the DIT and the Stroop Color and Word Test for
use within the proposed study.

Beyond support of these

instruments, this background confirmed the promise of the
proposed paradigm and the relevance of the hypotheses.
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CHAPTER III
DESIGN OF THE STUDY
This chapter details the methodology, design, and
null hypotheses of this study.
Methodology
The
terms

research

explored

a

tentative

of the relationship between cognitive

and moral reasoning.
empirical

paradigm

in

flexibility

This study focused, however, on the

exploration.

The

following

sections

reflect

this organization.
Sampling
Sampling

consisted

of

intact

subjects from college classes.

groups— voluntary

This method is justified

based on the emphasis of the study— the interest lay in
the

relationship

between

two

instruments/constructs

not in any particular population.
are included,

and

While descriptive data

it is as additional information with noted

limitations.
With

these

considerations,

acceptability

of the

sampling methods is assumed.

65
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Instrumentation
The research utilized the six-story version of
the DIT and the Stroop Color and Word Test.

Since the

instruments have already been described and related
research has been explored above, the following sections
are concerned only with the reliability and validity of
these tests.
The reliabilitv and validity
of the Stroop Test
While literature shows varied administrations and
scorings. Golden (1978) published and established a
standard usage of the instrument.

In addition, there

have been reliability and validity studies which speak to
the credibility of the Stroop Test.
Jensen (1965) reports test-retest reliabilities
of .88,

.79, and .71 on the word score, color score, and

color-word task scores, respectively.

Administration of

the Stroop Test to a group of subjects yielded testretest results of .89, .84, and .73 (M = 450) and
individual administration results of .86, .82, and .73
(N = 30) in Golden's study (1975) .
Supporting this. Golden reported reliabilities of
.85,

.81, and .69 (H = 60) for subjects' scores on

individual and group administered tests.

This finding

suggests the practical and reliable alternative of group
administration to the individual administration method.
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thus supporting this aspect of the methodology used in
this study.
Validity data consist of content validity and
factor analysis studies which support the flexibility
construct and the Stroop Test as a measure of that.
Content validity exists primarily in the inher
ent nature of the task presented by the Stroop Test — the
instrument demands that the subject create a response in
order to process a novel situation.
defines flexibility.

This very task

Beyond this definition of the

process, the behavioral descriptors of those classified
by the Stroop Test as constricted, and the comparision of
Stroop Test results on other personality/cognition tests
(see Chapter 2, pages 40-49) provide a supportive nomenological net for both the construct and the Stroop Test.
Factor analysis studies show three factors of
interference, word, and color (Golden, 1978; Jensen,
1965).

Golden's analysis of the Stroop Test tasks fac

tored out three factors, one of which was identified and
labeled as an interference factor— a factor with non-sig
nificant loadings from word and color-naming scores.
This factor, measured by the Stroop Test interference
score, does not duplicate measurement of word reading or
color naming abilities.

Instead, this interference score

reflects a previously unexperienced demand for a dif
ferential processing organization.
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This processing is seen as the selection of an
appropriate mosaic (it is believed that this selection
actually involves the creation of a mosaic for this
unique task).

The Stroop interference score measures

flexibility verus inflexibility in terms of the ability
to do this Stroop Test task relative to the other task
scores.

This study classifies this selection as cogni

tive flexibility within a cognitive mosaic repertoire.
Golden's study, therefore, supports the measurement of
flexibility as an ability separate from reading/naming
abilities, and supports the Stroop Test as a valid mea
sure of this study's definition of cognitve flexiblity.
Thus, reliability and validity information sup
ports the Stroop Color and Word Test as a research
instrument.

Killian (in Test Critiques. 1985) not only

considers the Stroop Test as highly valid and reliable
but suggests that the instrument be included in the basic
psychological battery.

The construct measured by this

instrument, flexibility, finds support in research and
conceptualizations within personality theory and related
fields of study.
The reliabilitv and validitv
of the PIT
Test-retest studies

(Davison & Robbins, 1978)

yield .70 and .80 reliability coefficients for the over
all index of moral judgment development (P) .

The stage
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scores,

in contrast, show reliabilities in the .50's and

,60's (Rest, 1986).

The DIT manual recommends use of

stage scores only within context of group means and when
using the six-story version of the DIT.
Robbins

Davison and

(1978) obtained alpha coefficients of internal

consistency .71 to .82.
The publishers note that the DIT offers objective
scoring— the researcher merely works with the rankings
given by the subject.

This characteristic shows consis

tency of measurement with the six-story version.

How

ever, it does not support the validity of the instrument.
The Mental Measurement Yearbook claims that "a
wide variety of evidence attests to the DIT's validity"
(Vol. 9, p. 441).

Studies examining concurrent validity

with other moral reasoning measurements

(e.g.. Rest et

al., 1974) report correlations up to the .70's.

In

contrast, researchers report non-significant correlation
with non-moral mental development.

This information

supports the construct measured by the instrument.
In addition to P and D scores, the DIT offers a
validity check.

Moreover, McGeorge

(1975)

found college

students were unable to fake good reasoning.
The DIT shows additional validity through longitudinal-change studies (e.g., Davison & Robbins, 1978)
which show subjects giving higher importance to higher
stage moral issues over time.

This contrasts with
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studies showing nonsignificant results from moral educa
tion programs (Rest, 1979).

Their ineffectiveness,

however, does not detract from other significant findings
relating to the validity of the DIT nor does it influence
this research.
Contesting the validity of the DIT, two main
studies looked to (1) a language sophistication or (2) an
action dimension as an explanation of scores on the DIT
rather than moral reasoning.

The first, proposed by

Moran and Joniak (cited in Rest, 1980), claimed that the
DIT merely reflected preference for more sophisticated
language with age.
Rest (1980) countered with claims that (1) the
researchers used incorrect age groups for such a study,
(2) that earlier studies using restatement measurements
showed an emphasis on meaning rather than sophistication,
(3) that the DIT uses a validity check which weeds out
responses to pretentious statements, and (4) very few
subjects reach the highest stages.
Researchers equating the DIT with an action
orientation (Martin, Shafto & Van Deinse,

1977) report

that in two of six stages they found that a decision
making construct correlated more closely with age than
the DIT P score.

Interpreted, this means that subjects'

responses appeared to be given based on decisions and not
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merely in terms of responses that seemed relatively more
action-oriented than others.
Rest answered that (1) one cannot separate moral
reasoning from behavior,

(2) not all statements involve

action, and (3) P does not use all stages for its score.
Cooper (1972), in turn, found a correlation of .34 bet
ween action and P scores.

In other words, moral reason

ing is related, but certainly not reduced, to action.
Of particular interest to this study, Buier,
Butman, Burwell, and Wicklin (1989) found no significant
differences between scores at three Christian colleges
versus general college norms on the DIT.

While Richards

(1989) reports that the P score is biased for a Mormon
population (see page 63), he found that the D score did
not underestimate the moral reasoning of this conserva
tive religious group.

As mentioned above, this study

focused on the relationship between the two tests and not
on the populations.

With this focus and the results of

these studies in mind, it is believed that the DIT proves
valid for the religous college population used in this
research.
The validity research, in addition to reliability
findings, supports the usage of the DIT.

The significant

amount of usage of the instrument in current studies and
the reviews and research corroborate the acceptance of
the DIT for moral reasoning assessment.

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

72
Procedure fAdministration)
1.

Each subject received a cover letter which

described the voluntary nature of the experiment and the
methods used to protect anonymity.
2.

Those subjects volunteering (no prospective

students declined) to participate took both the Stroop
Test and the DIT— half of the subjects took the Stroop
Test first, the other half took the DIT first.

This

controlled for treatment interaction effects on validity.
3.

The subjects heard standardized instructions

regarding general testing procedures.

This included the

protection of anonymity which was ensured with the use of
numbers.

Included on the top sheet of the first testing

materials was a removable, colored slip with an identify
ing number.

This number coincided with a number written

on the pages of the instrument itself.

The subjects were

instructed to keep this number in a place of their choice
until the next test was given.

The subjects were told to

write in this number on the second set of materials given
to them.
4.

The subjects heard the standardized instruc

tion included in test manuals for group administration,
after receiving the appropriate materials.
5.

Administration of the Stroop Test.
a.

Each student received a stapled book
let containing the three sheets.
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b.

The subject was given standardized
instructions before doing each task.

c.

The student was asked to do each task
silently, correcting mistakes.

d.

Each task was timed for 45 seconds.

e.

After calling "Stop", the subject was
instructed to circle the word that he
was reading at the time.

f.

The student was instructed to turn to
the next sheet of the booklet.
Instructions b through f were
repeated.

6.

Administration of the DIT.
a.

Each subject received a booklet
containing written instructions and
six dilemmas.

b.

Instructions were given as outlined
by the DIT manual.

c.

The subject was given 50 minutes to
complete the instrument.

d.

Manual instructions were followed
in answering questions from subjects.

7.

Subjects were debriefed and questions

answered.
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Procedure fPost-Administration^
1.

Raw data from the DIT were sent to the

Center for the Study of Ethical Development.
2.

Data from the Stroop Test were hand-scored

as prescribed by the manual's formulas.
3.

Prior to statistical analysis, each subject

was checked for acceptability.

A subject was discarded

if:
a.

there was a raw score of 8 or above
on the M scale of the DIT;

b.

there were more than eight errors in
a single story and/or more than two
stories with inconsistencies on the
DIT;

c.

the color naming was equal to or
greater than word-naming score on the
Stroop;

d.

the color-word score on the Stroop
was equal to or greater than either
the word naming or color naming
score;

e.

the color-word score on the Stroop
was below 20; or

f.

the researcher noted that the subject
used more than a 45-degree rotation
of the Stroop Test papers.
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Statistical Analysis
The analysis focused on the differences in fre
quency between those subject scores in certain categories
of moral reasoning and cognitive flexibility.

A chi-

square analysis was used to test the null hypotheses.
For the test of each hypothesis the value of alpha was
set at .05 on a one-tailed test.

In addition, descrip

tive data were analyzed and presented.
Statement of Null Hypotheses
1.

Among those subjects with a P score of 35-

46 on the DIT, there will fail to be a signifi
cantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility
scores above the sample median than below the
median.
2.

Among those subjects with a D score of 21-

27 on the DIT, there will fail to be a signifi
cantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility
scores above the sample median than below the
median.
3.

Among those subjects with a P score of 47

or higher on the DIT, there will fail to be a
significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexi
bility scores above the sample median than
below the median.
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4.

Among those subjects with a D score of 28

or higher on the DIT, there will fail to be a
significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexi
bility scores above the sample median than
below the median.
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CHAPTER IV
DATA ANALYSIS
This chapter reports and interprets the data
gathered from a sample of freshman and sophomore students
from two coastal eastern and western colleges in North
America.
Description of the Sample
The sample initially included 168 subjects.
Rejections based on Stroop's manual (see post-administra
tion procedures in Chapter 3) amounted to 27 subjects.
No rejections were made based on the DIT's M rating; how
ever, 8 additional rejections were based on the DIT's
consistency check.
The resulting sample included 13 3 subjects.
La Sierra College students comprised 99 of this number;
the remaining 34 subjects were students at Columbia Union
College.

This bi-coastal sample consisted of 68 (51.1%)

females and 65 (48.9%) males.

Their mean age was 18.99

years with a range of 17 to 40 years of age.
Table 1 describes general sample characteristics
on the Stroop Test and DIT.

The cognitive flexibility

and moral reasoning P and D score percentages
77
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Table 1
StrooD Test and PIT scores
Category

Mean

Range

47.518

29.000-70.000

5.008

P

40.585

6.700-75.000

6.203

D

23.537

7.025-40.400

2.889

Stroop Test Scores

SD

DIT Scores

R eproduced with permission of the copyright owner. Further reproduction prohibited without permission.

79
appear in Figures 5 and 6.

As mentioned earlier, these

are quartile groupings suggested by the DIT manual for
use in research.

A directional chi-square analysis and

other varied descriptive analyses were completed on the
sample.

The chi-square test was to be used to compare

observed and expected frequencies of flexible/not flexi
ble individuals as measured by the Stroop Test within
each of the upper two quartile groupings on the DIT.

To-

obtain the expected frequences required for the chisquare necessitated using the median rather than the mean
as the division point between flexible and not flexible
individuals.

The following sections detail the results.
Description of the Data

The frequencies of scores on the DIT and the
Stroop Color and Word Test formed the basis for testing
the null hypotheses.

In particular,

rejection or failure

to reject the null hypotheses depended on the frequency
of more flexible (above the median score on the Stroop
Test for the sample) versus less flexible (below the
median score on the Stroop Test for the sample) and
scores within the two upper quadrants of DIT scores.
Further description of the data is given in terms of this
relationship.
Table 2 gives the mean, range, and standard
deviation of the data for the sample, as broken down by
both the flexible-inflexible classification ("OF"
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P QUARTILE GROUPING FREQUENCIES

ABOVE THE THIRD
QUARTILE POINT;

LOWER TWO QUARTILE
GROUPINGS:

54.89

11.28%

BETWEEN THE SECOND AND
THIRD QUARTILE POINTS:

33.83%

Figure 5 . Percentages of the sample receiving scores in
the different P quartile groupings on the DIT.
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D QUARTILE GROUPING FREQUENCIES

THE THIRD
QUARTILE POINT:

18.80%

LOWER TWO QUARTILE
GROUPINGS:

42.11

BETWEEN THE SECOND AND
THIRD QUARTILE POINTS :

39.10%

Figure 6 . Percentages of the sample receiving scores in
the different D quartile groupings on the DIT.
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Tabl# 2
StrooD Test and PIT Statistics Per Cognitive Flexibility
and Moral Reasoning Levalm

F to ib is

Not FWmlW#

( > 48 on the stroop Test)
U#«m

R ang*

( < 48 on the Stroop Test)

SO

U a an

Rang#

SO

Above the Third Quartile Point on D Score
CF:

63.714

4 6 .0 -4 2 .0

6 .3 0 6

CF:

4 1 .7 2 7

3 6 .0 -4 7 .0

2.273

0;

33 .036

2 7 .6 -4 0 .4

3 .6 6 3

0:

20 .673

2 7 .6 3 6 .0

2.1 66

Between the Second and Third Quartile Points on D Score
CF:

63.670

4 6 .0 - 7 0 .0

4 .6 1 6

OF:

3 6 .2 2 7

2 6 .0 -4 7 .0

6.664

0:

23.663

2 1 .4 -2 6 .3

1 .6 47

0:

2 2 .6 6 0

2 0 .6 -2 7 .0

2.146

Below the Second Quartile Point
CF:

36 .6 0 0

4 6 .0 -6 6 .0

4 .7 6 6

CF:

4 1 .6 6 2

2 0 .0 -4 7 .0

6.616

0:

16.667

7 .0 2 -1 6 .6

3 .3 3 6

0:

1 6 .7 7 6

0 7 .6 -1 6 .4

4.163

Above the Third Quartile Point on P Score
CF:

63 .000

4 6 .0 -6 2 .0

6 .6 0 7

CF:

3 6 .6 0 0

2 6 .0 -4 6 .0

6.646

P:

64 .740

4 6 .7 -7 6 .0

6 .0 1 4

P:

6 1 .6 2 0

4 6 .7 6 0 .0

10.120

Between the Second and Third Quartile Points on P Score
CF:

64.262

4 6 .0 -6 4 .0

4 .6 6 2

CF:

4 3 .2 6 5

2 6 .0 4 6 .0

6.201

P:

40 .450

3 6 .0 -4 5 .0

3 .6 5 6

P.

3 6 .7 6 6

3 6 .0 -4 6 .0

2.663

Below the Second Quartile Point
CF:

64.623

4 6 .0 -7 0 .0

4 .6 5 6

CF:

40.031

2 6 .0 -4 6 .0

5.156

P:

26 .310

0 6 .7 -3 3 .0

6 .7 2 0

P:

24 .0 2 6

0 5 .0 -3 3 .0

6.421
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represents cognitive flexibility)

and the D and P scores

C'D" and "P" in Table 2) of the DIT.
An individual's score in relation to the sample
median on the Stroop Test operationally defines the
flexibile-inflexible classification.

Those above the

median (greater than or equal to a score of 48 for this
sample) were classified as flexible; those below the
median (less than a score of 48 for this sample) were
classified as inflexible.
Testing of the Hypotheses
The results noted above give a general descrip
tion of the sample.

Analysis of the four null hypothe

ses, however, necessitated testing the significance of
frequency differences.
Using the median of the sample, the expected
frequency of individuals above the median should be equal
to the number below the median in the top two quartile
groupings of both the DIT's P and D sample results.

A

one-tailed chi-square test was used to analyze the dif
ferences between the expected frequencies and the
observed, or actual, frequencies.
A one-tailed chi-square

analysis requires

correction factor in chi-square

tables. A

tional analysis with one degree

of freedom with

p < .05 requires a chi-square of 3.84.

a

non- direc

Chi-square
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tables, however, work with a two-tailed model not
directly applicable to directional analysis.
The hypotheses in this study look not only to
significant differences in the frequencies, but also to
the direction (direction here referring to flexible
versus not flexible) of the greater frequencies.
makes the analysis directional.

This

Corrections for this

difference involve using the two-tailed, p

< .10 chi-

square of 2.71 instead of 3.84 for each of the hypotheses
(Ferguson, 1981) .
references to

p

The reader will note that future
< .05 will represent a corrected chi-

square figure for a directional test with one degree of
freedom.
Hypothesis One
Among those subjects with a P score of 35-4 6
(between the second and third quartile points)

on the

DIT, there will fail to be a significantly higher fre
quency of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample
median than below the median.
Table 3 shows descriptive data and the contin
gency table information related to this hypothesis.

Cal

culation of a chi-square on the P scores in this range
resulted in a chi-square of .20 with one degree of free
dom and E > .05. This failed to meet the .05 statistical
significance level.
retained.

Thus null hypothesis one is

There are no significantly more flexible than
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Table 3
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis One

Number of subjects scoring between
the second and third quartile points on P

45

Subjects classified as "Flexible”

24

Subjects classified as "Not Flexible"

21

Mean of P scores
Flexible

40.45

Not flexible

38.77

Stroop Test score

Observed

Expected

(0-E) / E

Above median > 4 8

24

22.5

0.1

Below median < 4 8

21

22.5

0.1

Chi-square = 0 . 2 0 ; p > .05 non-significant finding
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inflexible individuals between the second and third
quartile points on the P score of the DIT.
Hypothesis Two
Among those subjects with a D score of 21-27
(between the second and third quartile points) on the
DIT, there will fail to be a significantly higher
frequency of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample
median than below it.
Table 4 shows descriptive data and the contin
gency table information related to this hypothesis.

A

chi-square of 3.50 with one degree of freedom and
E < .05 were found for this range of scores which meets
the .05 statistical signifance level.
thesis two is rejected.

Thus null hypo

There are more flexible than

inflexible individuals between the second and third
quartile points on the D score of the DIT.
Hypothesis Three
Among those subjects with a P score of 47 or
higher (above the third quartile point) on the DIT, there
will fail to be a significantly higher frequency of
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than
below the median.
Table 5 shows descriptive data and the contin
gency table information related to this hypothesis.
Calculation of a chi-square on the P scores in this range
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Table 4
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Two

Number of subjects scoring between
the second and third quartile points on D
56
Subjects classified

as "Flexible"

35

Subjects classified

as "Not Flexible"

21

Mean of D scores

Stroop Test score

Flexible

23.89

Not flexible

22.88

Observed

Expected

Above median > 48

35

28

1.75

Below median < 48

21

28

1.75

Chi-square = 3.50; p < .05; significant finding
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Table 5
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Three

Number of subjects scoring above
the third quartile point on P

15

Subjects classified

as "Flexible"

11

Subjects classified

as "Not Flexible"

4

Mean of P scores

Stroop Test score

Flexible

51.62

Not flexible

54.74

Observed

Expected

(0-E)^/ E

Above median > 4 8

11

7.5

1.63

Below median < 4 8

4

7.5

1.63

Chi-square = 3.27; p < .05 significant finding
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resulted in a chi-square of 3.27 with one degree of
freedom and e < .05. This also meets the .05 statistical
significance level.
rejected.

Thus the third null hypothesis is

There are more flexible than inflexible

individuals above the third quartile point on the P score
of the DIT.
Hypothesis Four
Among those subjects with a D score of 28 or
higher (above the third quartile point) on the DIT, there
will fail to be a significantly higher frequency of
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than
below the median.
Table 6 shows descriptive data and the contin
gency table information related to this hypothesis.

The

data in this range produced a chi-square of 0.36 with one
degree of freedom and e > .05.
four is retained.

Thus, null hypothesis

There are no more flexible than

inflexible individuals above the third quartile point on
the D score of the DIT.
Summary of Findings
The second and third null hypotheses were
rejected at the .05 level, thereby supporting the
corresponding experimental hypotheses.

However, the data

failed to reject the first and fourth null hypotheses at
the .05 level.
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Table 6
Descriptive Data Related to Hypothesis Four

Number of subjects scoring above
the third quartile point on D

25

Subjects classified

as "Flexible"

14

Subjects classified

as "Not Flexible"

11

Mean of D scores
Flexible

33.04

Not flexible

29.97

Stroop Test score

Observed

Expected

(O-E)**/ E

Above median > 4 8

14

12.5

0.18

Below median < 4 8

11

12.5

0.18

Chi-square = 0.36; p > .05 non-significant finding
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Discussion
A review of the findings thus shows that the
results support the second and third research hypotheses,
but failed to support the first and fourth research
hypotheses.

To determine the significance of these

results, it is necessary to explore these findings in
terms of hypothesis interpretation and integration.
Support of the Second Hypothesis
Statistically significant findings on this hypo
thesis means that among those with D scores between the
second and third quartile points there were significantly
more individuals classified as "flexible" than "not
flexible."

As stated previously, D scores represent a

general index of moral reasoning maturity which is devel
oped from a weighted formula of answers from stages one
through six.

In terms of the hypothesis, the results

support the hypothesized necessary but not sufficient
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral
reasoning.
Support of the Third Hypothesis
The results show a significantly greater fre
quency of "flexible" versus "not flexible" individuals
scoring above the third quartile point on the P index.
In contrast to the D score, the P score consists of a
weighted formula using levels 5 and 6 of the DIT.

More
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simply stated, these findings also support a necessary
but not sufficient relationship between moral reasoning
and cognitive flexibility.
Failure to support the First
and Fourth Hypotheses
Analysis of these hypotheses failed to support
the proposed necessary but not sufficient relationship
for the scores between the second and third quartile
points on the P score and above the third quartile point
on the D score.

However, the "trends" or "tendencies" in

the data (the number of subjects and differences in moral
reasoning means between flexible and inflexible groups—
see Table 2 and Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10) lend informal
support to these research hypotheses.

The follow-up

tests of the differences of means gave statistically sig
nificant support to these same hypotheses.
Figures 7, 8, 9, and 10 show the cognitive flexi
bility means ("CF") and the DIT P and D means ("P" and
"D")

for the lower two, third, and top groups determined

by the DIT adapted quartile groupings.
In statistical support of the classification,
"trend", directional t tests were used to analyze the P
and D means of the top two quartile groupings.

Each t

test compared two means— the flexible versus the not
flexible means on the P and D measures.
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D Score
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Figure 7 . D score and flexibility score means for the
lower two (below the second quartile point), third
(between the second and third quartile points), and
fourth (above the third quartile point) quartile groups
for those classified as "flexible".
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Figure 8 . D score and flexibility score means for the
lower two (below the second quartile point), third
(between second and third quartile points), and fourth
(above the third quartile point) quartile groups for
those classified as "not flexible".
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Figure 9 . P score and flexibility score means for the
lower two (below the second quartile point), third
(between the second and third quartile points), and
fourth (above the third quartile point) quartile groups
for those classified as "flexible".
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Figure 10. P score and flexibility score means for the
lower two (below the second quartile point), third
(between the second and third quartile point), and fourth
(above the third quartile point) quartile groups for
those classified as "not flexible".
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Table 7 shows the results of these analyses.

The

t test results on the data from hypotheses one and four,
hypotheses not supported by the chi-square tests,
indicate that the means on the moral reasoning measures
were significantly higher for the flexible than for the
not flexible subjects.
Chi-square analyses, chosen to test the hypo
theses, were believed more probably to determine subtle
differences between flexible and not flexible subjects.
Differences in the means between the flexible/not flexi
ble subjects on the D and P scores within the same quar
tile groupings, moreover, was not anticipated.

The

interpretation of a necessary but not sufficient rela
tionship rested on the number of flexible versus not
flexible individuals who were in the higher moral reason
ing groups.

While chi-square tests best suited the

hypotheses,

it is believed that the t tests provide

important additional statistical support for those hypo
theses previously not supported.
It is the opinion of this researcher that the
information just mentioned is both statistically sig
nificant (although not with the test of choice for test
ing hypotheses) and theoretically significant, especially
when viewed in terms of support for all of the hypothe
ses .
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Table 7
Hvpotheses-related Comparisons Between Flexible and
Not Flexible Groups on P and D Scores

Hvoothesis
First

Subjects
Flex

Means Per Grouo
24

P = 40.45

Not Flex 21

P = 38.78

Variance
12. 66
d^=

8.90

t = 1.692 with 43 degrees of freedom in
directional test. E < .05; Sig.
Second

Flex

35

D = 23.89

cS^=

3.70

Not Flex 21

D = 22.88

<5 =

4. 61

t = 1.812 with 54 degrees of freedom in
directional test, e < .05; Sig.
Third

Flex
Not Flex

11

P = 54.74

4

P = 51.62

d*=

81.25
102.40

t = 0.580 with 13 degrees of freedom in
directional test, e < .05; Sig.
Fourth

Flex

14

Not Flex 11

D = 33.04
D = 29.973

Cf

=

12.69
4.70

t = 2.502 with 23 degrees of freedom in
directional test, e < .01; Sig.
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It is proposed that the results may be due to a
lack of power in either the sensitivity of the chosen
instruments or, more probably, in the relatively small
number of subjects, both of which could lead to Type II
errors.

In terms of the fourth hypothesis, one would do

well to look first to the usable sample size which was
smaller than expected.
Ferguson (1988, pages 201-216) recommends a
minimum expected frequency of 5 for each cell for a chisquare test.

The sample size of 130 would normally give

expected frequencies of close to 32.5 in each quartile
grouping— paralleling that of the DIT norming samples.
As it turned out, however, the DIT distributions were
very different (see Figures 5 and 6).
In the D score distribution 56 were above the
second quartile point and 25 between the second and third
quartile point.

On the P scores, 45 were above the

second quartile point and only 15 were between the second
and third quartile points.
Therefore, while the overall number of subjects
utilized exceeded statistical needs, lower frequencies
were found than expected.

This is an interesting point

to note since the DIT uses adjusted quartile groupings
(scores adjusted downward— see Chapter 3) to promote a
more reasonable research spread than would be found in a
mere quartile division of possible points in moral
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development scores.

It may be that the testing situation

induced stress, which in turn led to regressed scores.
However,

in view of the procedures and controls used,

this possibility must remain highly speculative.
This lowering of scores may also reflect, in
part, the findings of Cullman (1989)

(see page 61).

His

report that the P score underestimated a conservative
religious group, similar to that used in this study, may
be seen in the lower number of subjects above the third
quartile point on the P score.
While the first hypothesis did not depend on the
lower frequencies to the extent found in the top quartile
grouping, it is also suggested that sample size may have
limited the power of this analysis.

It may be that

having higher frequencies for analysis would have
increased the chances of finding subtle, yet important
differences.
However, these statements do assume sufficiently
sensitive testing instruments.

While these instruments

are believed to be the most sensitive and valid in cur
rent usage, this does not necessarily mean that they have
sufficient power to detect subtle but nevertheless
important differences.

Should an improved version of the

instruments be available in the future,

further inves

tigation of this variable would certainly be warranted.
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If Type II errors have indeed occurred, it
remains for other researchers to explore further the pos
sibilities of undiscovered, confounding variables.
Integration of findings
The failure of the data to support two of the
four hypotheses does not create contradictory interpreta
tions for, as noted above, it appears that integration of
the findings are not only possible, but are indeed mean
ingful .
Integration of the two supported hypotheses with
the "tendencies" mentioned previously of the other two
hypotheses clearly supports a necessary but not suffi
cient relationship between cognitive flexibility and
moral reasoning.

The significance and implications of

this relationship follow in Chapter 5.
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CHAPTER V
SUMMARY, CONCLUSIONS, AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Personality, a construct representing the dynamic
integration of the individual, remains complicated, both
in theory and in research.

This study, while proposing a

paradigm of one aspect of personality, primarily focused
on the empirical exploration within that paradigm of the
relationship between cognitive flexibility and moral
reasoning.

To date, researchers had not related the

Stroop Color and Word Test and the Defining Issues Test
to moral reasoning.
The purpose of this study was to determine if
there is a relationship between moral reasoning, as
measured by the DIT, and cognitive flexibility, as mea
sured by the Stroop Color and Word Test in order to
provide evidence in support of this proposed mosaic
paradigm and in particular the construct of cognitive
flexibility.

It was not intended to generalize the

findings to specific populations. The paradigm also
provides a theoretical perspective on how, in one
respect, an individual interacts with his environment.
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Summary of Methodology
The Defining Issues Test and the Stroop Color and
Word Test were administered to freshman and sophomore
college students.

Half of the students took the DIT

first, and half took the Stroop Test first.

The DIT data

were analyzed by computer at the Center for Moral
Development in Minneapolis; the Stroop Test was scored by
hand, as were the data with chi-square and descriptive
analyses.
Summary of Findings
The data did not support the first research hypo
thesis (chi-square = .20, p > .05) which stated that
among those subjects with a P score (see page 17 for a
description of P and D scores on the DIT) of 35-46 on the
DIT, there would be a significantly higher frequency of
Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than
below the median.
The data did support the second hypothesis (chisquare = 3.5,

E < .05) which stated that among those

subjects with

a D score of

21-27 on the DIT, there would

be a significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility
scores above the sample median than below the median.
The data also supported the third hypothesis
(chi-square 3.27, p < .05)

which stated that among those

subjects with

47 or higher there would be a

a P score of
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significantly higher frequency of Stroop flexibility
scores above the sample median than below the median.
The data failed, however, to support the fourth
hypothesis

(chi-square 0.36, p > .05) which stated that

among those subjects with a D score of 28 or higher on
the DIT, there would be a significantly higher frequency
of Stroop flexibility scores above the sample median than
below the median (see pages 92 - 99 for more detailed
explanation).
In summary, the findings supported the second and
third research hypotheses, but they failed to signifi
cantly support the first and fourth hypotheses.

While

findings on the first and fourth hypotheses showed "ten
dencies'* (the means of the flexible group are higher than
those of the not flexible group)

supporting the research

hypotheses, they failed to reach statistical significance
with the chosen statistical tests.

It remains unknown if

increased sample size or further revisions of the instru
ments would make any difference in the results and the
following interpretation.
Conclusions
Full support, or lack of support, of all four
hypotheses would naturally make analysis of results
simpler.

Support of all four would lead directly to a

consideration of the importance of the findings.

Lack of

support might direct the attention to the implications of
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such findings and possible modifications of the research
design for future use.

Thus, either outcome would pro

vide a basis for further research.

Hypothesis findings

and interpretations, therefore, are related to the o r y .
which, in turn, may be applied to individuals as well as
to organizations.
It is believed that the findings of this study
are a contribution to knowledge of both a statistically
significant and non-statistically significant (trend)
nature; and therefore,

in this case, both of the above

stated possibilities of no support or full support must
be explored in the discussion.

While more technically

complicated, the following discussion suggests the sig
nificance of the hypotheses and provides insights into
the proposed paradigm.
Discussion of the results
The importance and implications of the hypotheses
focus on the relationship between cognitive flexibility
and moral reasoning.

As stated earlier (see Chapter 4),

the combined significant and non-significant findings
respectively support, directly and indirectly, the exis
tence of a relationship between these two aspects of the
personality.
It may be conjectured that cognitive flexibility
is a prerequisite for higher moral development.

It is

not, however, the onlv component needed for such
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development.

In fact, a number of subjects (28 on the

DIT D score; 41 on the DIT P score) with a "flexible"
classification on the Stroop Test failed to show average
or above average moral development.

It may be that

natural and supernatural factors, when combined with
cognitive flexiblity, prompt higher moral development.
The importance of this possibility of higher
moral reasoning lies in (1) the definitions given of
moral reasoning,

(2) its application in particular situa

tions, and (3) in the factors which affect the level of
moral reasoning attained.

For example, varied educa

tional, religious, and other systems (a group of inter
dependent individuals under the influence of related
functions creating a functional unit) claim to promote
and utilize higher moral reasoning.

Naturally, as these

systems vary, so do the forms of moral reasoning within
these settings.
The findings of this study speak to the necessity
of individual and collective cognitive flexibility within
these forms.

Cognitive rigidity (relative lack of cogni

tive flexibility— also called cognitive constriction)
used to either maintain a system (religious, educational,
political, corporate, and other), or to teach those in
the system, may preclude development of the flexibility
assumed here to be necessary for higher moral and other
reasoning.
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Fear of heresy, or even fear of change itself,
may lead to stunted individual/system growth, regression
of moral and other types of reasoning,

loss of system

membership, and even demise of the system.

As mentioned

in Chapter 2, stress can cause reasoning regression at
various levels.

The intra- and inter-individual conflict

and fears experienced can prompt regression and even
greater rigidity.

A church or educational system,

for

example, presumed to be bastions of reasoning, can quite
possibly become vehicles for individual and collective
regression.
It might be wise at this point to explore a
possible question of the reader.

Can cognitive flexibil

ity lessen the "protection" against "genuine error"?
While recognizing the subjective and objective qualities
of "truth" and "error", the question must still be
answered.
Based on the proposed paradigm and its definition
of cognitive flexibility, the answer is that it does not
increase already existing dangers of accepting errors.
The characteristics of cognitive flexbility include
tendencies to process contrasting ideas or viewpoints and
to deal with ambiguous information.

Prior research (see

page 41) found that those classified as flexible also
show a higher ability to deal with the accompanying
emotions of any given analysis or decision than those
less flexible.
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This does not, however, equate with a greater
acceptance of "error" or rejection of "truth".
the contrary,

Quite to

it is believed that it is the flexiblity

itself which "protects" the "truth".

This may or may not

include rejection of any given belief or behavior; this
may or may not include acceptance of any given belief or
behavior.

It does, however, allow presumed (by an

individual and/or system)
similarly analyzed.

"truth" and "error" to be

It is this analysis that moves the

beliefs beyond presumption.

While it does not prevent

acceptance of "error" or rejection of "truth",

it does

allow room for the exploration of "truth".
If the reader gleans nothing from this research
save one idea, it is hoped that it is an understanding of
the necessity to risk the inherent dangers involved in
seeking out the truth— its beliefs, behaviors, and moral
implications.
It is believed that people rob the "truth", moral
reasoning, and moral behavior of their most precious
assets (depth of understanding, ability to change, etc.)
by "protecting" them out of fear of rejecting or losing
them.

People themselves may rob themselves of "truth"

because of this same fear.
To move beyond this fear,

individuals allow the

capability of cognitive flexibility to guide cognitive
processing through appropriately selected or newly devel
oped mosaics.

This type of cognitive processing leads to
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the growth of the individual.

Moreover,

it is believed

that this growth embodies higher moral reasoning, higher
moral behavior, and a relatively greater understanding of
"truth".
Fortunately, the risks taken by an individual or
system in viewing alternatives, exploring what is
ambiguous, communicating with others with the same and
opposing views, recognizing their own and others' erao- •
tions, and,

in general, maintaining cognitive flexibility

can become the basis for cognitive growth, adaptation,
and survival.

An individual must incorporate the charac

teristics of cognitive flexibility, such as those just
mentioned,

into his personality.

Similarly an organiza

tion must incorporate cognitive flexibility into the
training of its members in order to grow.

Unfortunately,

some individuals perceive this as a risk to be avoided at
all costs.
A lack of understanding regarding the relation
ship between cognitive flexibility and moral reasoning in
individuals and organizations can lead to a standstill or
even to regression in moral development and other
cognitive functions.

Conversely, a clear understanding

of this relationship by individuals and organizations can
lead to more meaningful applications.
Incorporation requires, however, that an
individual or an organization have cognitive flexibility
as a goal or, at least, regard cognitive flexibility as
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important.

Usage of metacognition (thinking about think

ing) , understanding the dynamics of the interaction of
reason and emotion, tolerance in dealing with ambiguity,
and general practices of independent and open-minded
thinking represent possible ways in which cognitive
flexbility may be developed.

Awareness and acceptance of

flexiblity itself may very well be the cornerstone of
such development.
The following delineates the importance and
implications of the findings as applied to the proposed
paradigm.
Personalitv paradigm
Important in beginning this paradigm exploration
are findings on cognitive flexibility.

Again,

it is not

proposed that this study "proves" the paradigm, but
rather that it begins the investigation of support for
the paradigm.

As such, the importance of this research

lies in the initial information involving flexibility and
in the viability of the paradigm itself.
Paradigm reviewed.

A pattern or mosaic is a

unique combination of cognitive processes within the
mind.

The first mosiac may be genetically derived,

prompting early development.

It is this first pattern

that allows for the first interaction with the environ
ment.
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Once this first processing pattern is firmly
established, the person is able to interpret and utilize
data from the environment.

This mosaic, therefore,

exists as just one of many eventual mosaics.

Varied

experiences, maturation, and learning naturally prompt
new patterns.
The proposed paradigm consists of a hierarchy of
many such mosaics involving the cognitive subsystem.

It

is believed that this set of mosaics has two dimensions:
(1) adaptability (ranging from low to high adaptability)
and (2) mosaic recency (ranging from earliest formed to
most recently formed).

The capacity to select for use in

a situation an appropriate mosaic from among the mosaic
repertoire augments psychological and biological adapta
tion and survival.
If this cognitive flexibility is compromised, by
stress for example, individuals may show inappropriate
hierarchical regression (inappropriate usage of mosaic
— a less adaptive mosaic).

Regression patterns may vary

in inappropriateness for any given situation, and the
level of inappropriateness is relative to the individu
al's biological and psychological maturity.
The duration and dominating quality of such
regression depends on stress-related circumstances, the
cognitive flexibility of the personality, and the health
and coping mechanisms of the individuals.

It is
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believed that cognitive flexibility is necessary for the
growth and adaptation of an individual.
Cognitive flexibilitv.

Cognitive flexibility is

the capacity to select one mosiac from a pattern reper
toire and to create other patterns as needed.

It forms

the core of the paradigm and describes the individual
interacting with the environment.
While it is not proposed to fully define or sub
divide the components or processes of any given mosaic
(an impossible task due to the complex,

individualized,

conceptual nature of mosaics), an example is offered in
hopes of further clarifying the idea of cognitive flexi
bility.
A prominent example comes from events occurring
during the writing of this dissertation— that of the
"Chinese revolution" (the Tianamen Square, Beijing inci
dent in 1989).

Utilizing different mosaics, an

individual may "understand" this world event in corres
pondingly different ways.

Here "understanding"

includes cognition of the causes, dynamics of the situa
tion, and the consequences and implications of the event
within the context of cultural, social, political, and
economic characteristics of any given situation.
For instance, an individual may experience fear
concerning a possible World War III.

In the proposed
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paradigm, this fear may cause regression and thus use of
a less adaptive mosaic.
One such mosaic (see page 13, mosaic C) might
involve allowing for little ambiguous information, view
ing the event within the context of past United States
history, concern for how it affects that individual, the
expressing of moderate emotion, and focus on what a
particular significant other person considers important
about the event.
In more specific terms, the individual using this
mosaic may look to one particular news source, show
preference for a particular type of sensory input such as
audio or visual information concerning the event, view
the Chinese Revolution as merely a transplanted American
Revolution, and focus only on information of how the
event will economically affect the United States and
himself.
Further interaction of the cognitive subsystem
with the values, affective, sensory, and motor subystems
might lead to particular feelings, attitudes, and
behavior.

Feelings of patriotism with a positive

attitude of "rightness" of the event may lead to demon
strating with Chinese students in his city.

Moreover,

it is believed that this mosaic's processing of this
information will affect future processing with this
topic, with similar events, and even appropriately/inap
propriately with dissimilar events.

In other words, what
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we are is a sum total of our past experiences and choices
of processing.
While the reader may not find fault with the
general results of this mosaic's effect, this mosaic
could prove inferior to other, more adaptive mosaics.
Another limitation of this mosaic may be the individual's
looking to a source outside of himself to shape, not
merely to add to, his perceptions of the event.
Beyond the type, form, and amount of input pro
cessed, the individual simply did not deal with data
which might be conflicting.

It is believed that a par

ticular mosaic defines the parameters of conflict/
ambiguity.

Here, if new information conflicted

with information from the chosen source, the individual
more than likely just ignored the new data.
In not dealing with conflicting information and
perspectives, stress may have been reduced.

Processing

conflicting information involves the problem of deter
mining what is to be believed— a situation which draws
energy.

It is proposed that this drain increases the

level of stress, or may even equate with stress.

Yet,

while this mosaic may have reduced the stress of the
situation for the individual,

it remains doubtful that

the exchange for a more adaptable mosaic was equitable.
This reduction in the amount of information
utilized, the limited cultural, political, and economic
viewpoints, and the particular basis for feelings.
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attitudes, and behavior describe a less adaptive mosaic.
The individual did process the information; however,
another mosaic might have proven more adaptive.
For example, an individual with cognitive flexi
bility would be aware of his own cognitive processes and
would process any information with insights into his own
thinking (see page 11, mosaic A ) .
This more adaptive mosaic might have included a
relatively higher tolerance of ambiguity/conflict in the
information, the viewpoint of Chinese culture and poli
tics, concern for possible consequences for the
individuals in China, and an ability to express the
feelings evoked— a mosaic tailored (drawn from repertoire
or created)

for this event.

This individual may incorporate as many forms and
sources of information— dealing with ambiguous or con
flicting reports— to arrive at what he believes best
represents the situation, with a realization and accep
tance of what he will be unable to ascertain.

He may

view the Chinese Revolution as both similar and not
similar to other revolutions, but would maintain an
understanding within the context of the Chinese culture.
The cognitive subsystem interacting with values,
affect, sensory, and motor subsystems produces feelings,
attitudes, and a behavior repertoire.

His feelings may

involve a wide range of acceptable and expressed affect,
while he may not have established a set attitude beyond
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that of a positive attitude towards the event.

He may

exhibit no behavior related to the revolution save that
of discussing the event with others.
This mosaic incorporates those components more
suited to the event than the prior mosaic.

The amount of

information, the ability to perceive an event from
another cultural viewpoint, and the gleaning of "truth"
from a wide variety of sources and forms exhibits a
broadly based foundation of adaptability.
While the attitudes or behaviors resulting from
the chosen appropriate and inappropriate mosaics may not
differ, the reasoning and potential behaviors of the
appropriate mosaic are more adaptive to the situation— an
analysis that proves more valuable in understanding
current events in China.
This does not mean, however, that this inap
propriate mosaic would be inappropriate in all situa
tions.

It may be helpful,

for instance in learning a

simple, highly motor-focused task.

Non-conflicting

information from a competent source processed by a "fillin-the-blank" mentality (mosaic stereotype which leaves
much of the shaping of the input to someone else) might
prove best for this situation.
It is not believed that a new mosaic exists for
every new situation, but rather that a flexible
individual is more likely to use the most appropriate
mosaic.

The appropriateness depends on what is available
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from the environment and from prior experience or
insight, the individual's cognitive abilities, and the
complexity of the situation.

In some cases this may

involve a new mosaic, but in many cases this would be
unnecessary, even inappropriate.

It is cognitive flexi

bility that makes the choice possible.
The training of cognitive flexility and an aware
ness of thinking are believed to be primarily conscious
processes

(see page 13, Figure 3).

However, choice of

any new mosaic may not be a conscious choice.

Awareness

and self-development of cognitive flexibility, however,
prompt the likelihood of choosing (unconsciously/con
sciously) more adaptive mosaics.
Each mosaic reflects the unique preferences and
experiences of the individual.

Here uniqueness results

from a myriad of genetic predispositions interacting with
a possibly infinite combination of experiences which
forms a personalized mosaic repertoire.

The two mosaics

mentioned above were chosen for their extreme differences
in processing.

It is proposed that many mosaics exist

with any number of cognitive components.

It is an

individual's cognitive flexiblity which determines the
number, nature, and creation of mosaics best suited for
adaptation, survival, and growth within the many situa
tions encountered daily.
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The following section integrates this explanation
of cognitive flexibility and mosaics and reviews the
proposed paradigm with the research findings.
Integration of proposed paradigm with findings
The research results and interpretations show a
necessary but not sufficient relationship between cogni
tive flexibility and moral reasoning (see pages 91 - 101
where a more complete assessment of the findings is
addressed)•

This means that flexibility within the

cognitive subsystem is a necessary element of higher
moral reasoning which is assumed to involve the value and
cognitive subsystems.

It also means that such flexibil

ity is not the only element necessary for higher moral
reasoning.

This impacts on the proposed paradigm in

terms of indicating a relationship among the constructs
of cognitive flexiblity, cognitive mosaics, and the
cognitive and other subsystems.
This study suggests and supports a relationship
between flexibility and general reasoning abilities.
is believed that these abilities,

It

in turn, affect other

subsystems within the proposed paradigm.
As mentioned previously according to the Wardell
and Royce model, personality exists as an integrative
function.

Moral reasoning in this study,

for instance,

exists in the interaction between the cognitive and value
subsystems within the personality.

Such interactions
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exist between other subsystems, creating a dynamic whole
called the personality.
In fact, addition of one of these subsystems—
affect— is required in the description of "flexible"
individuals (see Chapter 2).

This researcher prefers the

term cognitive-affective flexibility to cognitive flexi
bility, as the former more accurately reflects the
dynamic characteristic of a mosaic.
Within this paradigm, it is believed that higher
moral reasoning represents the choice of an appropriate
mosaic.

This more highly developed reasoning involves

analyzing a problem from multiple perspectives;

inclusion

of ambiguous and/or conflicting information; acceptance
of emotional input; and often, processing from a
perspective unique to the analysis of a particular situa
tion— a process descriptive of cognitive flexibility.
This perspective involves a combination of cogni
tive processes which in this study is called a mosaic or
pattern.

The choice of an appropriate cognitive mosaic

is a function of cognitive flexibility.
Again, the interpretation of the results of this
study show that cognitive flexibility appears to be a
necessary basis for higher moral reasoning.

Yet students

classified as "flexible" on the Stroop Test did not all
show higher moral reasoning on the DIT.

It is suggested,

therefore, that cognitive flexibility is not the only
factor involved in higher moral reasoning.

Instead
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cognitive flexibility is a necessary but not sufficient
basis for higher moral reasoning.
This study, therefore, indicates the proposed
relationship between cognitive flexibility, cognitive
mosaics, and the cognitive and other subsystems within
the context of the proposed paradigm.

In other words,

the research findings of a relationship between cognitive
flexibility (Stroop Test scores) and moral reasoning (DIT
scores) can be taken as evidence for the paradigm subsys
tems of which they are considered a part.
The relationship between cognitive flexibility
and moral reasoning can be taken also as evidence for an
interaction between the subsystems.

Furthermore, with

cognitive flexibility so closely related to cognitive
mosaics in the paradigm, evidence for cognitive flexibil
ity can be considered as evidence for the existence of
cognitive mosaics.
While cognitive mosaics remain a construct
reflecting processes within the personality, support of
this construct provides a framework for analysis of both
cognitive processes and the personality.
In light of these associations, the proposed
personality paradigm appears viable.

The significance of

this possibility is that of the heuristic potential of
any newly proposed personality paradigm.

That, in turn,

has further ramifications for theory and practice.
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In addition to the associations and implications
just previously noted, there are other, more extended
implications.
For instance, an individual or society may know
ingly affect the number, type, and sophistication of
mosaics utilized by an individual.

It is believed that

these mosaics develop from a genetic and environmental
relationship, although the specific genetic limitations
and the actual amount of possible environmental control
cannot be determined.
While the proposed paradigm remains a concep
tualization for explaining cognitive processes in gen
eral, the implications and potential applications can be
explored in terms of relation to early development,
continuing development, and links with behavior.
Early development.

As mentioned earlier (see

Chapter 1, Description of the Proposed Paradigm), the
paradigm proposes a developmental task of a first-learned
mosaic.

[(The development of subsequent mosaics is in

part explainable through the use of developmental task
theory (e.g., Havighurst, 1972)].
Can parents, teachers, friends, and others know
ingly influence these developmental tasks?
might this be accomplished?

If so, how

While developing flexibility

and more advanced mosaics is envisioned as a continuing
task,

is there a "critical” period for cognitive
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flexibility or the formation of any particular mosaic?
As this research represents only beginning paradigm
exploration, the answers to these questions remain tenta
tive.
It is believed, however, that beginning answers
include (1) the possibility of nurturing cognitive
flexibility (and additional mosaics), (2) teaching tech
niques for self-growth, and (3) modeling cognitive flexi
bility. This "nurturing" may begin (it is not implied
that full self-awareness and understanding occurs within
the first few years) with teaching and modeling a tenet
of metacognition— awareness of one's own thinking.

Upon

this foundation, skills in recognizing and dealing with
conflicting and ambiguous information and emotions can be
demonstrated, taught, prompted, and encouraged.
These objectives can be accomplished through
guiding individuals through "novel" and challenging
situations and the making of decisions.

This guidance

includes asking those questions which make a person aware
of different perspectives for any situation, modeling
relative comfort in the presence of ambiguous informa
tion, and teaching them to deal with conflicting ideas
within the limits of their cognitive reasoning abili
ties.

Most importantly, this sharing includes showing

the developing person how to deal with difficult situa
tions without paralyzing or regression-prompting fear.
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In contrast, this does not emphasize the
encouragement of individuals to focus on changing "grey"
situations

(situations involving conflicting, ambiguous

information or perspectives with no "right" answer)

into

black and white problems for which there is a relatively
easily recognized answer.

Instead it involves training

and honing abilities to utilize cognitive flexibility and
associated mosaics in accepting or tolerating many life
situations of an ambiguous nature.
Moral dilemmas often involve situations where one
set of values and morals comes into conflict with alter
native sets of values and morals.

Cognitive flexibility,

the ability to develop or choose a mosaic to deal with a
specific situation, allows the individual to incorporate
possibly competing values and morals into a unique solu
tion.

This relatively more inclusive and developed

approach permits a potentially higher form of moral
other)

reasoning.

(or

In this approach, the moral decision

does not become one of choosing between the morality of
stealing versus the value of life.

Both aspects are

incorporated within a higher moral reasoning utilizing
cognitive flexibility.
As many behaviors resulting in growth may become
self-reinforced,

it is believed that such guidance in

cognitive flexibility can promote self-reinforced growth
toward increased flexiblity and reasoning abilities.
Such guidance, however, comes best from cognitively
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flexible individuals— these individuals can both teach
and model behavior based on personal past experiences.
The ability to discuss openly those ideas and
perspectives which differ from one's own belief system
requires a great deal of cognitive flexibility.

The

danger of fear-prompted regression becomes even greater
when this conflict involves beliefs of a church, corpora
tion, governmental, educational, or other system.

While

religious systems may traditionally represent closely
held,

fought-for beliefs, any system may hold written/

unwritten beliefs.
It is recognized that the degree of possible fear
from having a belief or resulting code of behavior chal
lenged is definitely related to the importance given such
beliefs and/or behaviors, and that some systems
naturally involve different levels of importance to an
individual.

Nonetheless, it is believed that fear and

fear-prompted plateaus or regressions may occur in any
system where the individual accords undue importance to
that system's written/unwritten beliefs.
For example, a political organization may have an
unwritten code of behavior that discourages direct con
frontation of an advisor's proposal.

If one individual

challenged this code and did question an idea or even a
master plan, for instance,

fear may be prompted in those

individuals nearing the top of the political ladder.

If
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this fear results in several of these individuals select
ing an inappropriate mosaic, such as one of ignoring all
ideas or differing perspectives proposed by the chal
lenging individual, group think may result.

This group

think, in turn, may result in stagnation or even dissolu
tion of the political party or organization.
Another current example, this one from the cor
porate world, involves the common belief that spouses
cannot or should not work within the same level (usually
a high, executive level) of a corporate structure.

This

experience, new to corporate systems, often results in
the firing of one or both executives.
Whatever the fear behind the inability to not
even consider all the alternatives to this new dynamic
within the system (noted inflexibility in not considering
new options sometimes having conflicting and/or ambigious
information about the results of such a situation), the
usage of such a fear-prompted mosaic costs corporations
valuable human resources.

The solution for integrating

this relationship into higher levels of many corporations
remains unanswered.

It is not proposed that the answer

itself will be simple or uncomplicated.

It is proposed,

however, that this is just another example of the rela
tionship between cognitive flexibility, fear, and growth.
It shows, moreover, possible results of this interaction
within any system.
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Can the "average" adult foster cognitive flexi
bility in youth when this process courts a chance for
them to believe and behave in conflict with a societal or
religious belief system important to him?

Fear of this

outcome could lead to cognitive regression and constric
tion of the adult— which he may unwittingly model and
teach them.
If the more mature individual elects the "safer"
avenue, those younger than he may or may not finally
embrace his belief system.

He has, however, taken away

opportunties for them to understand their own thinking
processes,

and he has reduced opportunities for learning

the art of cognitive flexibility from his influence.
This absence, in turn, may lead potentially to a
new generation of "constricted" individuals who have
difficulty in understanding,

let alone encouraging,

cognitive flexibility in others.

Under these cir

cumstances, self-perpetuating "constriction" may lead to
stunted individual and organizational growth.

It may

even lead to the eventual death of a religious, politi
cal, societal, or other belief system.
Hope may be found in the proposed belief that
cognitive flexiblity is a continuing growth task which
should be encouraged in adulthood— an occurrence which,
in part, may break a vicious cycle of inflexibility.
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Continuing development.

It is believed that cog

nitive flexibility and the development of mosaics, while
perhaps more easily learned in certain situations, is not
restricted to a "critical" growth period.
potentially continues throughout life.

This task

Applications of

the proposed paradigm, therefore, go beyond early devel
opment to continuing development.
With current knowledge and available testing
instruments, means for adult development of cognitive
flexibility include, for one, the identification of
"flexible" versus "less flexible" individuals.

Training

programs, inservice seminars, support groups, and coun
seling can additionally develop their technniques,
pacing, and goals to accomodate to the developmental
needs of their trainees or clients.
In the graduate preparation of those in the
helping profession (see Chapter 1, page 3) adaptive
intervention and counseling sessions may prove important
in the process of facilitating professional and personal
growth.

It is not suggested that extended therapy would

change this situation, but rather that a variety of
services could promote cognitive flexibility and adapta
tion within and beyond the typical graduate program.
These interventions and services might start with
stress-related tactics.

For instance, training in

conflict-oriented communication, stress reduction, and
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coping techniques may, in part, eliminate the fears and
anxiety that can evoke more primal, less adaptive mosa
ics .
Future teaching and counseling practices dealing
with hierarchical regression may actually increase cogni
tive flexibility in those so instructed.

It is postu

lated that working through issues of trust with "less
flexible" individuals at regressed levels may produce a
more solid foundation within the mosaic hierarchy.

It is

in moving towards cognitive flexibility, however, that
potentials for adaptation, survival, and growth are
realized.

With further exploration of cognitive flexi

bility and more advanced techniques of classification,
individuals may indeed develop greater capacity for
cognitive flexibility.
Cognitive flexibilitv and behavior.

Possible

behavioral evidences of cognitive "constriction" and
regression have been mentioned previously.

In contrast,

how will increasing cognitive flexibility translate into
behavior?

This question involves consideration of the

process beginning with information processed through
cognitive mosaics and other subsystems as they contribute
to the decisions and behavior within the strictures of
realized circumstances.
As seen in the context of moral reasoning, cogni
tion is not always consistent with, nor does it predict.
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behavior.

This is because reasoning exists as only one

factor in organizing and acting out options within any
behavior repertoire.

Since many theories explain the

relationship between cognition and behavior (e.g.,
Bandura, 1977; Piaget, 1951; Tolman, 1948), that syn
thesis is not attempted in this discussion.
It is proposed, however, that any potential
behavior based on a decision involving relatively allinclusive and synthesized information and insight can be
more adaptive and "moral" than behavior based on a "con
stricted" decision.

In other words,

it is believed that

cognitive flexibility not only increases behavior
options, but also increases the potential for more devel
oped and adaptive behaviors within an individual's reper
toire.

The link between cognitive mosaics and behavior

exists, therefore, in a form such as to facilitate the
creating of potentially improved behavior.
While this link may never be fully understood, it
is believed that the applications mentioned above reflect
a potential for individually and societally-based in
creased cognitive flexibility.
One can hardly speculate on the limits of such
potentials.

With the immense capabilities and unused

potential that exists within the two brain hemispheres,
it is suggested that the potential exists for an infinite
number of patterns to be developed.

The fact that the
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mind is composed of two hemispheres instead of a simple
mass of neurons suggests a myriad of interactional fac
tors.

The importance and further implications of the

proposed paradigm lies in (1) heuristically forwarding
attention to an understanding of the requirements for
facillitating the wholistic integration of the two hemi
spheres,

(2) noting correlation with observations, and

(3) developing applications of the theory.
Personality theories, by nature, remain concep
tual.

It remains for collective observations and empiri

cal explorations of aspects of the theory to support or
fail to support the proposed paradigm.

This study com

bined both theory and research in this beginning inves
tigation of the paradigm.
Summary
In combination with findings from the hypotheses,
the suggested paradigm advances knowledge and provides
encouragement for possible applications.

Further analy

sis of other relationships and aspects of the paradigm
lie with future studies.
Recommendations
The following suggestions are made:
Recommendations for practice
1.

Recommendations for practice lie in an
understanding and employment of cognitive
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flexibility within training situations.
This involves prompting and using openmindedness, communication with others with
dissimilar viewpoints, appropriate usage
of affect, personal comfort with ambiguity,
and an insight into "thinking about think
ing. "
2.

Parallel to the preceding suggestion, it
is highly recommended that systems of all
types (church, education, businessoriented organizations, etc.)

incorporate

the characteristics of cognitive flexibility
into all aspects of their structure and
encourage such traits on an individual level.
For further research
1.

Relationships between cognitive flexibility
and other aspects of personality certainly
warrant further investigation.

2.

More refined instruments measuring cogni
tive flexibility need to be developed.

It

is hoped that such tests will then become
available to professionals.
3.

It is recommended that other studies
empirically explore varying aspects of the
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proposed paradigm or framework (e.g.,
cognitive flexibility and self-concept,
cognitive flexiblity over time).

While the

preliminary theoretical nature of the para
digm is recognized, possibilities for
empirical support invites investigation.
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